Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund
By Lawrence Broz, Michael B. Hawes. International Organization, 2006
112 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Development, Finance, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c0f78dbd6cdf58c32a93caa9e9dd424c9a2db06c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Development
- Jeffrey M. Chwieroth
- Dustin Tingley
- Helen V. Milner
- J. Vreeland
- Susanne Lütz
- Matthias Kranke
- R. Stone
- Axel Dreher
In Finance
- Jeffrey M. Chwieroth
- Helen V. Milner
- Susanne Lütz
- Matthias Kranke
- J. Vreeland
- Stephen Weymouth
- Dustin Tingley
- R. Stone
In Political Science and International Relations
- Dustin Tingley
- J. Vreeland
- Helen V. Milner
- Jeffrey M. Chwieroth
- Stephen Weymouth
- Susanne Lütz
- Matthias Kranke
- Niklas Potrafke
Citations in the corpus
- IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies (2006, background): “At the level of recipient country domestic politics, 4 See, for example, Broz and Hawes (2006), Dreher and Sturm (2006), Dreher et al. (2006), Oatley and Yackee (2004), Stone (2002, 2004), Thacker (1999). governments have been known to seek out IMF conditionality to gain leverage over domestic…”
- “The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending (2012, methodology): “geopolitical interests, I follow others (Broz and Hawes 2006; Oatley and Yackee 2004) in using United Nations (U.”
- The European rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF lending to Central and Eastern European countries (2014, background): “The local proximity to the U.S. government may be a factor or not, but U.S. (geo-)political and economic interests—with support from private actors (Broz and Hawes 2006)—figure among the common explanations for the thrust of lending policies, as well as its occasional deviations (Momani 2004; Stone…”
- Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy (2011, background): “We wonder, for instance, if the results about how political economy models affect the trade policy preferences of legislators might change if one included a measure of presidential foreign policy concerns in the model+ The work of foreign policy scholars, as noted above, clearly shows that the presi”
- Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on US Presidential Voting (2017, background): “…we distinguish between and among: goods and services that are tradable versus nontradable (that is, internationally contestable or not), highversus low-skilled work (consistent with US comparative advantage) and manufacturing versus services industries (owing to inter-industry wage differentials).”
- THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN LEGISLATORS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AID (2009, background): “Foreign economic aid, like trade, is one part of an internationalist foreign policy that seeks to maintain a stable, open world economy; hence, groups that benefit from such openness tend to support aid, as Broz and Hawes (2006) argue with respect to international financial policy.”