Initiative, Incentives and Soft Information. How Does Delegation Impact The Role of Bank Relationship Managers?

By José María Liberti. 2003

122 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9d3c1c6aafc63ffef7ede0ef20063d62680502aa

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Citations in the corpus

Bank Size or Distance: What Hampers Innovation Adoption by SMEs? (2010, background): “Moreover, empowering loan officers increases the effort they devote to screening and monitoring borrowers, and improves the performance of the bank (Liberti, 2003), but also increases the resources that the parent bank devotes to loan reviewing activities (Udell, 1989).”
The Impact of Competition on Bank Orientation (2007, background): “…the proper incentives to collect and take advantage of “soft” information (that cannot “travel” so easily up the chain of command), precisely the type of information that could be needed to advance relationship banking (see also Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2005), Liberti (2004)).”
The Impact of Organizational Structure and Lending Technology on Banking Competition (2009, unknown): “Liberti (2004) examines how a change in the organizational form within a large bank affects incentives.”
The Flattening Firm and Product Market Competition: The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Corporate Hierarchies (2010, background): “This is surprising given the role found, not only for hierarchies (Liberti, 2006; Garicano and Hubbard, 2007), but also for organizational (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002) and human resource practices in explaining firm productivity (Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997; Black and Lynch, 20”
Lending relationships in line-of-credit and nonline-of-credit loans: Evidence from collateral use in small business (2006, unknown): “Liberti (2003)provides some direct evidence on the processing of soft information from the changes in the hierarchical structure of foreign commercial banks in Argentina.”
Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers (2012, unknown): “Banks in this environment are thus particularly reliant on the risk-assessment of their front-line employees, which in turn introduces significant scope for moral hazard and agency conflict within the lending institution (see, for example, Liberti (2005), Liberti and Mian (2009)).”
Competition and regulation in the banking sector: A review of the empirical evidence on the sources of bank rents (2007, background): “Recent empirical evidence by Liberti (2002) indeed confirms bank centralization and the intensity of usage of hard information go hand in hand.”
Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting (2010, background): “For a given bank, Liberti and Mian (2006) show that the sensitivity of credit approval to hard information is larger for credit applications handled at higher hierarchical levels, i.e. levels that are more distant from the source of information.”