The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding

By J. Kvanvig. 2003

757 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9b3780daccf2e9cd5f6da456e1114541780d03be

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Citations in the corpus

Explanation, understanding, and control (2014, unknown): “Kvanvig (2007, 2009), for example, has distinguished between the understanding one has of a proposition, termed “propositional understanding,” and the understanding that one has of an entity (such as a scientific theory), termed “objectual understanding.””
FOLK ATTRIBUTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING: IS THERE A ROLE FOR EPISTEMIC LUCK? (2016, methodology): “A defense of Kvanvig’s account of understanding is beyond the scope of this paper; for our purposes, the key point is the compatibility between understanding and epistemic luck.4 As there is no settled account of understanding, Kvanvig proposes to look at some data regarding which cases we would or ”
Expanding the Dimensions of Epistemic Cognition: Arguments From Philosophy and Psychology (2011, background): “…might consist of a collection of disconnected facts, understanding involves grasping “explanatory connections between items of information,” (Kvanvig, 2003, p. 193) and seeing how information fits together.4 Similarly, some philosophers have argued that the construction of explanations is…”
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge (2009, background): “11 For example, recent studies in psychology and cognitive neuroscience by Joshua Greene and by Jonathan Haidt suggest that moral judgments (or intuitions) are often a product of emotion and affect, even when the respondent considers subtly different hypothetical scenarios.”
Your evidence? Machine learning algorithms for medical diagnosis and prediction (2019, background): “Until recently, epistemology paid less attention to other epistemic states, in particular to understanding (Kvanvig, 2003).”
What Would It Take to Change an Inference? Using Rubin’s Causal Model to Interpret the Robustness of Causal Inferences (2013, background): “For education research to inform policy, it should emerge through debate among a community of scholars about the relative merits of different studies (e.g., Greco, 2009; Habermas, 1987; Kuhn, 1962; Kvanvig, 2003; Sosa, 2007).”
No understanding without explanation (2013, background): “Kvanvig (2003) makes a broadly similar, though not identical, distinction between “objectual understanding” and “propositional understanding”.”
Functional explaining: a new approach to the philosophy of explanation (2014, unknown): “26 E.g. Elgin (2007) or Kvanvig (2003).”