The Speed of Employer Learning

By Fabian Lange. Journal of Labor Economics, 2007

381 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9aa4fcba50248a12d99166a70c27118476dcff40

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Citations in the corpus

Employer Learning, Productivity and the Earnings Distribution: Evidence from Performance Measures (2014, neutral): “lim t→∞ cor(pit, pit+1) = σ(2)q + ρ σ(2)u 1−ρ2 σ(2)q + σ(2)u 1−ρ2 (25)”
Asymmetric Information between Employers (2013, methodology): “Lange (2007) de nes the speed of employer learning as the relative weight employers place on the rst new signal of ability.”
The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence (2012, methodology): “The traditional approach, as found in the seminal analysis of Lazear and Rosen (1981), is that the firm commits to a promotion prize that is independent of the identity of the promoted worker.”
Heterogeneity in Human Capital Investments: High School Curriculum, College Major, and Careers. NBER Working Paper No. 17985. (2012, neutral): “105(3):473–522 [43] Lange F.”
The Signaling Value of a High School Diploma (2014, background): “While these estimates are consistent with the earlier sheepskin estimates (at least for whites), there are two reasons why they may be an unreliable guide to the signaling value of a high school diploma.”
Landing the First Job: The Value of Intermediaries in Online Hiring (2016, neutral): “[24] Lange, Fabian.”
A multidisciplinary survey on discrimination analysis (2013, methodology): “The speed of employers in learning about the productivity of workers was originally modeled by Lange (2007) and estimated using the NLSY data set.”
Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market: Theory and Empirics (2012, neutral): “One major objection to statistical dis‑ crimination models is that the market learns worker productivity much too quickly (Lange 2007) for educational signaling and statistical discrimination to be important in the long run.”
Social Networks, Employee Selection, and Labor Market Outcomes (2016, background): “Lindqvist and Vestman (2011) provide a detailed account of the data.”
The role of education in intergenerational social mobility: Problems from empirical research in sociology and some theoretical pointers from economics (2014, background): “on individuals’ chances of ‘getting in the door’ (Bills, 1988) – with the degree of their subsequent advancement then depending primarily on how far the potential that their education served, more or less reliably, to signal is actually expressed (Lange, 2007).”
The Big Sort: College Reputation and Labor Market Outcomes (2017, positive): “In other words, we find support for MacLeod and Urquiola’s (2015) assumption that labor markets do not immediately observe all individual characteristics (such as Icfes or AFQT scores), and college membership may transmit some of them.”