Board Overlap, Seat Accumulation and Share Prices

By Claudio Loderer, U. Peyer. 2002

287 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/97c032717a999e5d9539c8a328c62fc76783aed4

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Citations in the corpus

Busy Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence from Mergers (2018, unknown): “…is documented by Fich and Shivdansani (2006), Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Core et al. (1999), and Ahn, Jiraporn, and Kim (2010), while positive aspects of multiple directorship are documented by Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan (2013), Loderer and Peyer (2002), and Masulis and Mobbs (2011).”
Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What They Do, What They are Worth, and Why They are (Still) There (2010, unknown): “17 For Switzerland, another universal banking country, Tobin’s Q is not significantly correlated with the presence of bankers on the board (Loderer and Peyer, 2002).”
Corporate Governance and Control (2003, unknown): “The announcement of a bank loan agreement (new or renewal) is associated with positive abnormal returns, while private placements or public issues have no or a negative effect [James (1987)], a finding that has been consistently confirmed for renewals [Lummer and McConnell (1989), Best and Zhang (19”
Is Board Size an Independent Corporate Governance Mechanism (2004, methodology): “We include board size to examine whether it is an independent control mechanism or simply related to the other mechanisms, but with no peculiar impact on other firm characteristics (see Loderer and Peyer, 2002).”
An Integrated Framework of Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation - Evidence from Switzerland (2004, unknown): “As suggested for example by Chung and Pruitt (1994), Perfect and Wiles (1994), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Kang and Stulz (1996), and Loderer and Peyer (2002), among others, Tobin’s Q is estimated as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to the book value of total…”
The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the UK (2009, background): “For Switzerland, Loderer and Peyer (2002) find a significantly negative impact on Tobin’s Q (although not on profitability) whilst Beiner et al. (2004 and 2006) find no negative impact.”
The efficacy of principle‐based corporate governance practices and firm financial performance: An empirical investigation (2010, methodology): “2 Dependent variables Tobin’s Q as the performance measure is commonly used as a dependent variable (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Hossain et al., 2001; Kang and Stulz, 1996; Loderer and Peyer, 2002; Perfect and Wiles, 1994; Reddy et al., 2008a).”
Boardroom Centrality and Firm Performance (2013, unknown): “This is consistent with the idea that the number of board positions a director holds (or busyness) is negatively associated with monitoring efforts and shareholder wealth (Core et al., 1999; Fich and White, 2003; Loderer and Peyer, 2002; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).”
Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the EU Area (2011, unknown): “We compute Tobin‟s Q as the sum of total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by total assets (e.g., see Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Loderer and Peyer, 2002).”
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from the Insurance Sector of Ghana (2012, background): “These studies (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Loderer and Peyer, 2002; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Carline et al., 2002; Mak and Yuanto, 2002) have found negative relationship between board size and firm performance.”