Leverage decision and manager compensation with choice of effort and volatility

By Abel Cadenillas, Jakša Cvitanić, Fernando Zapatero. 2004

130 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/96d20e2b25564ba534d6820cff22a45e0fddadb1

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Franz Willi Kellermanns
2. James J. Chrisman
3. Jess H. Chua
4. Alfredo De Massis
5. Thomas M. Zellweger
6. K. Eddleston
7. Nadine H. Kammerlander
8. J. Kotlar

In Finance

1. James J. Chrisman
2. Franz Willi Kellermanns
3. Filipe M. Santos

In Strategy and Management

1. James J. Chrisman
2. Franz Willi Kellermanns
3. Jess H. Chua

Citations in the corpus

• A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure (2011, unknown): “This result contrasts to Cadenillas, Cvitanic, and Zapatero (2004), in which the log agent’s compensation space is restricted to equity shares, and shareholders commit to this compensation scheme.”
• Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “Through yet another theoretical model, Cadenillas, Cvitanic, and Zapatero (2004) considered the effects of incentive pay on firm leverage decisions.”
• Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms (2007, background): “For example, incentive compensation may be used for risk sharing rather than agency cost control (Cadenillas et al., 2004) or, as suggested by neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977–1978), agency cost control mechanisms may be imposed upon family managers to mimic”
• Stocks or Options? Moral Hazard, Firm Viability, and the Design of Compensation Contracts (2008, unknown): “Cadenillas et al. (2004) study the incentive effects of debt on a risk-averse manager in a dynamic continuous time framework.”
• Corporate Leverage: How Much Do Managers Really Matter? (2007, unknown): “Both stockholdings and option portfolios are used to estimate pay-performance sensitivities since Core and Guay (2002) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that incentives from stock and options grants and holdings are much greater than those provided by direct compensation in the form of salary and b”