Corporate Leverage: How Much Do Managers Really Matter?

By Murray Z. Frank, Vidhan K. Goyal. 2007

180 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ea96c70f43f094eeca9dc72938d111e24543a608

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Citations in the corpus

CEO's financial experience and earnings management (2013, background): “…(1) those involving firms in the financial industry; (2) those involving firms that were in special trade (ST) status in either turnover year or 1 Frank and Goyal (2007) suggest that if a manager runs a firm for a long time, then a managerial fixed effect will be hard to tell apart from a firm…”
Managerial Attitudes and Corporate Actions (2013, unknown): “Research suggests that large firms typically have more debt (Frank and Goyal, 2007).”
Behavioral Consistency in Corporate Finance: CEO Personal and Corporate Leverage (2012, methodology): “Panel A shows that there are 39 In untabulated results, we regressed HomeLev on combinations of various CEO personal characteristics and the Frank and Goyal (2007) determinants of leverage.”
Female leadership and gender equity: Evidence from plant closure (2015, background): “Several studies find evidence of managerial fixed effects on a variety of corporate outcomes (Weisbach, 1995; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon, 2006; Frank and Goyal, 2007).”
Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms (2014, background): “…literature identifies many interesting trade-offs, the empirical evidence is scarce because [as noted by Prendergast (2002)] and others the econometrician can rarely observe the roles and responsibilities behind the corporate decision-making process, including how these vary across different…”
Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation (2011, unknown): “The effects of other factors on leverage are consistent with the evidence documented in the literature (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2003, 2007a, Leary and Roberts, 2005, Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008, and Roberts and Sufi, 2008).”
Capital structure decisions in family firms: empirical evidence from a bank-based economy (2011, unknown): “For example, Frank and Goyal (forthcoming) show that the industry median leverage ratio has the single largest explanatory power for the firm-level leverage in their long-term dataset on U.S. firms. Although we use industry dummies to control for industry effects in general, we therefore include ind”
Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt (2007, background): “Frank and Goyal (2007a) show that, as an empirical issue, interest coverage ratios are not attractive.”
Overconfidence and Early‐Life Experiences: The Effect of Managerial Traits on Corporate Financial Policies (2011, unknown): “In contrast to prior literature on managerial fixed effects (Weisbach (1995); Chevalier and Ellison (1999); Bertrand and Schoar (2003); Frank and Goyal (2007b)), we identify specific managerial characteristics, derive their implications for financial decisions, and measure their effects empirically.”
Corporate Finance Policies and Social Networks (2017, background): “For a more in-depth discussion on social networks and organizations, refer to Kilduff and Tsai (2003). (2)A behavior that takes into considerations the actions of other individuals can be entirely rational. For example, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) show how people conform to social no”
Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation (2013, methodology): “Using related modeling techniques, others have found evidence of manager-level style effects in leverage choices (Frank and Goyal (2007)), compensation levels (Graham, Li, and Qiu (2009)), accounting/tax choices (Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010), Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010)), and performance…”