Pay Without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment
By Bengt R. Holmstrom. 2006
156 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9458421058948c93ae45d82ebf2b1ec134ad116d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Alex Edmans
- Xavier Gabaix
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- W. Guay
- Radhakrishnan Gopalan
- Fenghua Song
- John E. Core
- Michael W. Faulkender
In Strategy and Management
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Alex Edmans
- Xavier Gabaix
- John E. Core
- W. Guay
- Radhakrishnan Gopalan
- Michael W. Faulkender
- P. Francisco
Citations in the corpus
- Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much (2008, unknown): “These forces have almost certainly been at work, but it is unclear how important they are for the typical firm (Holmstrom 2006).”
- Do Independent Directors Cause Improvements in Firm Transparency (2014, background): “As noted by Holmstrom (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and others, if management believes that a more independent board will monitor their actions and decisions more intensively, they may be reluctant to disclose information that can be used for disciplining purposes.”
- Does the presence of independent and female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity (2016, background): “1 Independent directors and firm performance The board of directors’ primary function is to advise on strategy formulation and decision-making (Holmstrom 2005; Adams and Ferreira 2007).”
- Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups (2010, background): “4 Even with the governance rules put in place by the exchanges to empower the BOD and independent directors who ‘‘approach their jobs with diligence, intelligence, and integrity,’’ board actions likely favor CEOs given a range of market data on competitive pay levels (Murphy, 1999; Holmstrom, 2005).”
- Board structure and survival of new economy IPO firms (2012, unknown): “Holmstrom (2005) contends that intense monitoring destroys the trust essential for the chief executive officer (CEO) to share important strategic information with directors.”
- The costs of intense board monitoring (2011, unknown): “Holmstrom (2005) argues that intense monitoring destroys the trust necessary for the chief executive officer (CEO) to share relevant strategic”
- Strategic Flexibility and the Optimality of Pay for Sector Performance (2010, background): “[16] Holmstrom, Bengt, 2005, “Pay without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment,” Journal of Corporation Law 30, 703-713.”
- Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012, background): “= ¡ 1− ¢ = ( ) (40)”