The Missing Lens in Family Firm Governance Theory: A Self-Other Typology of Parental Altruism

By M. Lubatkin, Rodolphe Durand, Yan Ling. 2007

163 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/92d3f0b3f70abe9abc38973c8b9aebb2e30973ad

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In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

Paternalistic leadership in family firms: Types and implications for intergenerational succession (2014, background): “Another strand of the literature has studied paternalism in family firms and draws insights from the family firm and household economics literature that distinguishes paternalistic altruism from other distinct forms of altruism (Lubatkin et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2002).”
The Adolescence of Family Firm Research (2012, background): “According to this view, the unchecked exercise of personal authority is inconsistent with the development of meritocratic highperformance organizations (Lubatkin et al., 2007).”
Perceived Parental Behaviors and Next-Generation Engagement in Family Firms: A Social Cognitive Perspective (2018, background): “Note, though, that the perceived appropriateness of parental support and control also depends on the norms of the larger society in which it operates (Lubatkin et al., 2007).”
Parent–Child Relationships: Planting the Seeds of Deviant Behavior in the Family Firm (2012, background): “Additionally, if an out-group child perceives his/her parent’s altruism as paternalistic, whereby the parent acts generously so as to coerce the child (Lubatkin et al., 2007),”
Stewardship Theory: Realism, Relevance, and Family Firm Governance (2019, background): “Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) and Kano and Verbeke (2015) argue that instead of stewards or agents, people are better characterized as boundedly reliable, which means they may sometimes exhibit behaviors that seem opportunistic but are often (but not always) benevolent in the sense that their failed ”
Are Family Firms Good Employers (2017, background): “Altruism can also make it difficult for family firms to monitor and discipline family members (Schulze et al., 2001), leading to perceived inequities in the supervision and compensation of family and nonfamily employees (Lubatkin et al., 2007).”