Founder-CEO Succession and the Paradox of Entrepreneurial Success

By Noam Wasserman. Organ. Sci., 2003

549 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/92a2c320e663169a6b8b5062124c96ab7d8e8e71

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Citations in the corpus

Experienced entrepreneurial founders, organizational capital, and venture capital funding (2007, background): “…to potential negative effects from the entrepreneur’s perspective associated with VC funding such as increased hazard of founder-CEO succession (Wasserman, 2003), taking a company public too early (Gompers, 1996), higher equity under-pricing at the time of an intial public offering (Lee and…”
Doing More with Less: Innovation Input and Output in Family Firms (2016, unknown): “Both founder and family CEOs might be considered trusted partners because of their high levels of attachment to the firm (Wasserman, 2003; Zellweger et al., 2012).”
Family firms: A research agenda and publication guide (2011, background): “Wasserman (2003) suggests that more radical changes are likely with an outside successor.”
Top management teams and the performance of entrepreneurial firms (2013, background): “, even weak firms can IPO) and fail to capture relevant differences among top management teams and their investors such as their preferences for liquidity versus control (Wasserman 2003).”
When does transitioning from family to professional management improve firm performance (2015, background): “While the CEO succession decision per se has been studied in a few works in the context of family firms (Allen and Panian, 1982; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980; Wasserman, 2003), and more extensively without distinguishing between family and nonfamily firms (Dalton and Kesner, 1983; Datta and Rajagopala”
Entrepreneurship and Family Firm Research: A Bibliometric Analysis of An Emerging Field* (2016, background): “In the latter case, analysis has been focused on the factors that determine the success of the succession (Salvato, Chirico, and Sharma 2010; Wasserman 2003), with particular reference to tax issues of the latter (Bjuggren and Sund 2005; Ellul, Pagano, and Panunzi 2010).”
Founders, Private Equity Investors, and Underpricing in Entrepreneurial IPOs (2009, background): “Instead, this environment offers a setting where the founders of IPO firms are typically the largest shareholders and retain majority control even after the IPO (Wasserman, 2003).”
Ownership versus Management Effects on Performance in Family and Founder Companies: A Bayesian Reconciliation (2011, unknown): “expertise (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Wasserman, 2003; Willard, Krueger, & Feeser, 1992), and also at odds with research advocating the replacement of founders with outside, “professional” managers (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Flamholtz, 1990).”
The downside of being ‘up’: entrepreneurs' dispositional positive affect and firm performance (2011, background): “Additional research offers support for this proposal with regard to the fact that, as fi rms grow, they often reach a point at which founding entrepreneurs must ‘let go’—surrender authority over operations to professional management—if their fi rms are to continue to develop and become established p”
Entrepreneurial exit as a critical component of the entrepreneurial process: Theoretical development (2010, background): “At the time of new venture creation, the founders often own all of the company's equity (Wasserman, 2003).”
Turning Lead into Gold: How Do Entrepreneurs Mobilize Resources to Exploit Opportunities? (2018, unknown): “In a large-scale study of the succession of founder – CEOs, Wasserman (2003) finds that founders are more likely to experience succession events, that is, be replaced, when they sell large portions of their equity to investors.”
The contingent value of venture capitalist reputation (2011, background): “…when uncertainty and complexity are high (Thomas, 2002), and respond to signaling behaviors and certifications (Pfeffer, 1981; Porac et al., 1999; Westphal and Zajac, 1998) and taken-for-granted rules of thumb (Pollock et al., 2009; Wasserman, 2003) that may be decoupled from actions and quality.”
The throne vs. the kingdom: Founder control and value creation in startups (2017, background): “…abilities and startup needs (Wasserman, 2003).13 Thus, the need for—and potential impact of—attracting 13 This “paradox of entrepreneurial success” (Wasserman, 2003) suggests that a startup’s pre-succession performance could be high, yet we could still see replacement of the founder due to the…”