Governance Bundles, Firm Performance, and the Substitutability and Complementarity of Governance Mechanisms

By Andrew J. Ward, Jill A. Brown, D. Rodriguez. 2009

250 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91af6f3379d8f889cf70041ba76c5d4e8e8881a7

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Young Kyun Chang
2. Tae-Yeol Kim
3. Won‐yong Oh

In Strategy and Management

1. Tae-Yeol Kim
2. Won‐yong Oh
3. Young Kyun Chang

Citations in the corpus

• Complementary or Substitutive Effects? Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Social Responsibility (2018, background): “Ward et al. (2009) also noted that firm performance is determined by the conditions under which various monitoring functions and incentive alignments interact with each other.”
• National Governance System, Corporate Ownership, and Roles of Outside Directors: A Corporate Governance Bundle Perspective (2014, unknown): “It refers to a combination of corporate governance practices that interact and consequently complement or substitute each other as a bundle of related practices (Aguilera et al., 2011; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Ward et al., 2009).”
• Bundles of Firm Corporate Governance Practices: A Fuzzy Set Analysis (2013, unknown): “More recently, Ward, Brown, and Rodriguez (2009) present a conceptual model of CG complementarities and substitutability and argue that the trade-offs between the different governance practices are contingent on firm performance.”