Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets
By James Bushnell. 2005
155 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ff9dc898828b0eca9ea3da9839a8f8988f9aa171
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Daron Acemoglu
- Asuman E. Ozdaglar
- Ali Kakhbod
- Andy Philpott
- Erling Pettersen
- M. Fowlie
- P. Restrepo
- Philippe Aghion
In Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Asuman E. Ozdaglar
- Ali Kakhbod
- Andy Philpott
- Daron Acemoglu
- Erling Pettersen
- M. Fowlie
- Antonio J. Conejo
In Management Science and Operations Research
Citations in the corpus
- Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage (2008, background): “2002; Bushnell et al. 2008; Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Puller, 2007; Sweeting, 2007; Wolfram, 1999). Empirical papers that assess the implications of the exercise of market power in other energy intensive sectors targeted by these regional programs include Ryan (2008) and Rosenbaum and Sukharoman (2001)”
- Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Energy Sources (2017, methodology): “Linear cost and linear demand are adopted as a good approximation to energy markets in several previous works, e.g. Allaz and Vila (1993); Bushnell (2007); Banal-Estanol and Micola (2009).”
- Optimizing demand-side bids in day-ahead electricity markets (2006, methodology): “One way of simplifying this game is to assume that the day-ahead price will equal the expected regulating price (as done in the seminal work of Allaz and Vila [1] under a perfect foresight assumption, and in the electricity context by [10], [13], and [9]).”