Complementary Bidding Mechanisms and Startup Costs in Electricity Markets

By Mar Reguant. Social Science Research Network, 2014

150 citations recorded by the source corpus.

I extend multi-unit auction estimation techniques to a setting in which firms can express cost complementarities over time. In the context of electricity markets, I show how the auction structure and bidding data can be used to estimate these complementarities, which in these markets arise due to startup costs. I find that startup costs are substantial and that taking them into account helps better explain firm bidding strategies and production patterns. As in other dynamic settings, I find that startup costs limit the ability of firms to change production over time, exacerbating fluctuations in market prices. These fluctuations can induce estimates of market power that ignore dynamic costs to overstate markup volatility, with predicted markups that can be even negative in periods of low demand. I show how accounting for startup costs can provide a natural correction for these markup biases.

Subfields: Accounting, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6567403f2b7d7eb8a076feec394ad0fbb936a3de

How researchers see this paper

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In Accounting

  1. Catherine Hausman
  2. Lucas W. Davis

In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

  1. Catherine Hausman
  2. Lucas W. Davis
  3. Kevin Novan

In Management Science and Operations Research

  1. Catherine Hausman
  2. Lucas W. Davis

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