Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal Form Games
By Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, Georg Weizsäcker. 2008
356 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8a261a3aa93628db6d219baa22ec5fb3fffd1e68
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- E. Renner
- Simon Gächter
- María P. Recalde
- Glenn W. Harrison
- Kevin Leyton-Brown
- E Elisabet Rutström
- Colin F. Camerer
- Tore Ellingsen
In General Decision Sciences
- Glenn W. Harrison
- E Elisabet Rutström
- Nathaniel T. Wilcox
- Isabelle Brocas
- Steffen Andersen
- Juan D. Carrillo
- Simon Gächter
- E. Renner
In Safety Research
- Glenn W. Harrison
- Nathaniel T. Wilcox
- Simon Gächter
- Tore Ellingsen
- Juan D. Carrillo
- Isabelle Brocas
- E. Renner
- Colin F. Camerer
Citations in the corpus
- Naive play and the process of choice in guessing games (2015, background): “…subjects in the game as those players who make weakly dominated choices (above 64) after having had some time to consider the decision.3 1 See also Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2008) who find that subjects’ reported beliefs are often not consistent with chosen actions in two-person simultaneous…”
- “Last-Place Aversion”: Evidence and Redistributive Implications (2014, unknown): “13See, e.g., Nagel (1995) and Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008), in which most players appear to be level-1 and Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004), where players appear to be level-1.”
- Three Very Simple Games and What It Takes to Solve Them (2009, unknown): “For that reason, we do not elicit beliefs in an incentive-compatible manner, and our aim is not to assess whether subjects act on their beliefs (see, e.g., Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008).”
- Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game (2012, unknown): “The results of Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) provide a good benchmark regarding such inconsistencies of actions and beliefs in one-shot games, but it is by now very little understood under which conditions players best respond more to their beliefs than in others, whether this depends on their…”
- Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Tasks with Low Promotability (2017, background): “For example Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) find inconsistencies between the actions individuals take and their belief statements, and argue that “we need to be cautious when evaluating elicited beliefs to understand action choices” (p.”
- Estimating subjective probabilities (2014, methodology): “Croson [2000] and Hurley and Shogren [2005] used scoring rules that are linear in the absolute deviation as well as providing a bonus for an exactly correct prediction.”
- Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race Among Truth Serums (2015, unknown): “The numbers are similar to the findings in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008), while Rey-Biel (2009) finds higher rates of best-response to stated beliefs.”
- When Does Communication Improve Coordination (2010, background): “The task is not easy, since direct elicitation of beliefs tends to yield quite different measures than revealed measures of beliefs, possibly because direct elicitation affect the depth of subjects' strategic thinking; see Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008).”
- Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model (2008, background): “3Several other experimental studies have sought to elicit subjects’ subjective beliefs in environments other than the voting game that we examine (Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker 2005; Croson 2000; McKelvey and Page 1990; Nyarko and Schotter 2002; Offerman, Sonnemans, and Schram 1996; Rutström and…”
- Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games (2013, background): “, 2001; Cooper and Van Huyck, 2003; Haruvy and Stahl, 2007; Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008; Stahl and Haruvy, 2008; Rogers et al., 2009). We study all ten11 of these datasets in this paper. See Table 1 for a summary. Goeree and Holt (2001) presented 10 games in which subjects’ behavior was close t”
- Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games (2014, background): “The combination of belief elicitation and choices (Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008; Tingley and Wang, 2010) can also help in understanding cognitive processes.”