Internal Corporate Governance, CEO Turnover, and Earnings Management

By Sonali Hazarika, Jonathan M. Karpoff, Rajarishi Nahata. 2012

473 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/89ad234c9d14a8570344dd67e0ca8cf7e307a221

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Citations in the corpus

The influence of individual executives on corporate financial reporting: A review and outlook from the perspective of upper echelons theory (2016, background): “Hazarika et al. (2012) report that CFOs with higher tenure are less often involved in restatements.”
The Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management Behaviors: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China (2014, background): “Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata (2012) also show that an effective board can restrain senior managers from pursuing aggressive earnings strategies to manipulate accruals.”
Short Selling and Earnings Management: A Controlled Experiment (2016, unknown): “Indeed, Hazarika et al. (2012) find that the likelihood of forced CEO departure increases with the firms’ use of discretionary accruals.”
Analyst Coverage and Real Earnings Management: Quasi-Experimental Evidence (2014, background): “Managers of these firms experience declines in compensation (Matsunaga and Park (2001)) and a greater likelihood of turnover (Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata (2012), Mergenthaler, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan (2012)).”
Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers (2015, background): “However, despite the importance of these questions, most of the existing evidence on the relations between board characteristics and board monitoring as reflected in CEO compensation and turnover decisions is plagued by the endogeneity problem identified by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003). As a r”
Independent Director Incentives: Where Do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy? (2014, background): “…there is no news of a new job acceptance, poor health, or death, and a retirement decision is not announced at least six months prior to 25 the departure press release, then this is also treated as forced (Parrino, 1997; Huson, Malatesta and Parrino, 2004; and Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata, 2012).”
Co-opted Boards (2014, unknown): “For comparison, the equivalent number is 0.019 in Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata (2012) (inferred from their Table 1) and is 0.030 in Mobbs (forthcoming).”
How far can we trust earnings numbers? What research tells us about earnings management (2013, background): “Hazarika et al. (2012) examine the link between EM and the forced turnover of CEOs.”
Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading (2016, unknown): “Laksmana (2008), Hoitash et al. (2009), Li and Srinivasan (2011), Chen et al. (2012), Hazarika et al. (2012), Hoechle 5 Board size - Number of directors on the board.”