Does Corporate Diversification Destroy Value

By John R. Graham, Michael L. Lemmon, Jack G. Wolf. 2002

819 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/89aaefb30f4413f0b176d60790c6713846bc65f8

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate diversification and shareholder value: a survey of recent literature (2003, background): “24 Graham et al. (1999), Hyland (1999), Campa and Kedia (1999) and Villalonga (1999).”
The Anatomy of Bank Diversification (2010, background): “…problems (e.g., Whited 2001), data problems (e.g., Harris 1998; Villalonga 2004), selection biases in terms of firms, observation period or country (Graham et al. 2002; Lins & Servaes 1999) and failure to account for the endogeneity of the diversification decision (Campa & Kedia 2002) have driven…”
Controlling for endogeneity with instrumental variables in strategic management research (2008, background): “Because the omitted variables and simultaneity biases are already well explained in the management literature (e.g. Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham et al., 2002; Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Li and Prabhala, 2006; Miller, 2006; Shaver, 1998), more attention will be devoted in this article to…”
Does the Diversification–Firm Performance Relationship Change Over Time? A Meta‐Analytical Review (2018, neutral): “Several authors (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Chevalier, 2004; Graham et al., 2002; Villalonga, 2001) have suggested that the diversification discount observed in the capital market results from selection effects, because discounted firms self-select into pursuing diversification strategies.”
Post-Merger Restructuring and the Boundaries of the Firm (2011, background): “Market values do not drop after conglomerate mergers (Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf, 2002).”
Financial Synergies and the Optimal Scope of the Firm: Implications for Mergers, Spinoffs, and Structured Finance (2007, background): “This and related results have been challenged on the basis that diversified firms trade at a discount prior to diversifying: see, for example, Lang and Stulz (1994), Campa and Kedia (2002), and Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002).”
Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance (2005, neutral): “SPLi = γsZsi + ψsi (34) DIVi = γdZdi + ψdi (35)”
Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns (2003, neutral): “While Hasbrouck (1985) finds that the average q-ratio of acquired firms is low, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) find that the q-ratios of targets are insignificantly different in unopposed vs.”
Capital Market Development, International Integration, Legal Systems, and the Value of Corporate Diversification: A Cross-Country Analysis (2003, background): “1 By contrast, other empirical evidence suggests that diversification does not necessarily reduce firm value (e.g., Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) and Campa and Kedia (2002)).”
International corporate diversification and performance: Does firm self-selection matter? (2009, background): “Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) show that the discount occurs because firms acquire already discounted business units, and Chevalier (2004) shows that crosssubsidization between divisions is apparent in the pairs of merging firms prior to their mergers.”