Fairness and contract design
By Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klein, Klaus M. Schmidt. 2007
474 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9c1bffdea6e6fa33247f817a86d505742aa453a3
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Stefan T. Trautmann
- Samuel Bowles
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Susanne Kremhelmer
- Ken Binmore
- Avner Shaked
- Ernst Fehr
- Sandra Polanía-Reyes
In Economics and Econometrics
- Ernst Fehr
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Susanne Kremhelmer
- Stefan T. Trautmann
- Samuel Bowles
- B. Kőszegi
- Ken Binmore
- Avner Shaked
In Safety Research
- Ernst Fehr
- Samuel Bowles
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Susanne Kremhelmer
- Sandra Polanía-Reyes
- Stefan T. Trautmann
- Ken Binmore
- Avner Shaked
Citations in the corpus
- Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations (2007, background): “Englmaier and Wambach (2005) and Fehr et al. (2006) study optimal contract design when agents care for the relative payo¤.”
- Behavioral Contract Theory (2014, background): “Motivated by Fehr et al. (2007), suppose that a proportion q of individuals in society are inequity averse as above, but a proportion 1 − q are selfish.”
- Experimental economics: Where next? (2010, background): “Fehr and Schmidt (1999) diverge from the theory of Bolton and Ockenfels by postulating a more tractable functional form:”
- Lab Labor: What can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab? (2010, unknown): “However, based on evidence from Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2007), where an implicit and incomplete contract with an unenforceable bonus outperforms a complete contract with contracted effort enforced through partial monitoring and the incomplete contract is selected 88% of the time, they argue that…”
- Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights (2008, methodology): “Our article is also related to Fehr and Schmidt (2004) and Fehr et al. (2007) which also focus on the importance of the interaction between selfish and fair types.”
- A tractable model of process fairness under risk (2009, methodology): “The model builds on the Fehr–Schmidt social utility theory for outcome fairness that has been applied successfully in empirical and theoretical work on financial decisions with social comparisons (Gebhardt, 2005), contract theory (Englmaier & Wambach, 2005; Fehr, Klein, & Schmidt, 2007 ), and prefe”