The Diffusion of Ideas over Contested Terrain: The (Non)adoption of a Shareholder Value Orientation among German Firms

By Peer C. Fiss, Edward J. Zajac. 2004

872 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/85d5f7790093969f952050808d27981785d5fc80

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Citations in the corpus

Culture, meaning, and institutions: Executive rationale in Germany and Japan (2009, positive): “Fligstein (2001), inspired by Bourdieu (1977) among others, presents a theory of “fields,” or organized social spaces in which collective actors (such as CEOs and their board colleagues)”
State Capacity, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Stock Market Development (2016, background): “…protections over the following three decades was driven by a specific yet evolving set of policies implemented by states, including market reforms, deregulation, and privatization driven by power-related, ideological, and normative factors (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Fiss and Zajac, 2004).”
How are Practices Made to Vary? Managing Practice Adaptation in a Multinational Corporation (2014, positive): “Instead, practices are likely to be adapted during diffusion – arguably a dynamic, contested and emergent process (Ansari, Fiss & Zajac, 2010; Drori, Höllerer, & Walgenbach, 2013; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007) – that is ‘temporally and contextually provisional’ (Orlikowski, 2000).”
Means versus Ends in Opaque Institutional Fields: Trading off Compliance and Achievement in Sustainability Standard Adoption (2014, neutral): “…of goal achievement were not, or only marginally, considered, including: the number of adopters (Schuler & Christmann, 2011); the diffusion process (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Lawrence, Winn, & Jennings, 2001; Weber, Davis, & Lounsbury , 2009); the stage of adoption (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Ansari, Fiss, &…”
Doing More with Less: Innovation Input and Output in Family Firms (2016, neutral): “Moreover, the “ German Mittelstand, ” which consists of a large number of rather resource-constrained family firms (Fiss & Zajac, 2004), holds a large number of innovative “ hidden champions ” thatalsohappentobeinnovationleadersin theirspecificmarkets(Simon,1996).”
Investor Perceptions of Financial Misconduct: The Heterogeneous Contamination of Bystander Firms (2015, result): “…when considered alongside previous research that has shown that management’s strategic framing of governance mechanisms may affect stakeholder perceptions (e.g., Fiss & Zajac, 2004, 2006; Zajac & Westphal, 1995), points to the need for future research taking a more social view of governance.”
An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities (2008, neutral): “…in codes of ‘good’ corporate governance rely on universal notions of ‘best practice,’ which often need to be adapted to the local contexts of firms or ‘translated’ across diverse national institutional settings (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Fiss and Zajac 2004; Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005).”
Comparing capitalisms: understanding institutional diversity and its implications for international business (2008, background): “…they tend to adapt to Anglo-American shareholder-oriented institutions through legitimacy-seeking symbolic management and decoupling of shareholder-value practices from other ‘‘core’’ stakeholder-oriented practices, such as those related to human resource management (Fiss & Zajac, 2004).”
CEO Narcissism and the Impact of Prior Board Experience on Corporate Strategy (2015, positive): “Firms are especially likely to imitate the practices of other firms to which their top executives have interlock ties, formed when directors on one board join another (Burt, 1987; Davis, 1991; Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Fiss and Zajac, 2004).”
A General Theory of Organizational Stigma (2009, background): “…“institutionally-contested” rather than “illegitimate” because, while powerful actors in the institutional environment may oppose a contested practice, some important actors in the environment may favor and advocate use of that contested practice (e.g., Fiss & Zajac 2004; Sanders and Tuschke 2007).”
The Family Innovator's Dilemma: How Family Influence Affects the Adoption of Discontinuous Technologies by Incumbent Firms (2013, background): “…some of the largest corporations—are substantially influenced by families (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) but also because owners and investors in general (Benner, 2007), and family owners in particular, play important roles in shaping the strategic activities of firms (Fiss & Zajac, 2004).”
Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical Review and Future Directions (2009, background): “A similar notion is decoupling where an actor claims conformity or adoption, yet implements a new practice differently or does not actually implement it (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Fiss and Zajac, 2004).”