Collective action and the evolution of social norms
By Elinor Ostrom. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000
3,997 citations recorded by the source corpus.
I assume multiple types of players--“rational egoists,” as well as “conditional cooperators” and “willing punishers”--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.
Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/834634c92dd0d51ed7be72e4b738f4cdd5eccf62
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Ernst Fehr
- Simon Gächter
- Bruno S. Frey
- Urs Fischbacher
- Benedikt Herrmann
- J. Bergh
- L. Schechter
- M. Osterloh
In Safety Research
- Ernst Fehr
- Simon Gächter
- Urs Fischbacher
- Bruno S. Frey
- Benedikt Herrmann
- Armin Falk
- Juan-Camilo Cardenas
- L. Schechter
In Sociology and Political Science
- Ernst Fehr
- Bruno S. Frey
- Urs Fischbacher
- Simon Gächter
- Benedikt Herrmann
- Juan-Camilo Cardenas
- Armin Falk
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
Citations in the corpus
- The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2011, background): “Since the seminal papers by Yamagishi (1986) and Ostrom, et al. (1992) there is substantial experimental evidence that many people are willing to punish free riders at own costs. Punishment can mitigate the free rider problem and induce high cooperation levels.(1) Thus, a conclusion from these exper”
- Evolutionary thinking in environmental economics (2007, neutral): “An important finding is that externally imposed rules and monitoring can reduce and destabilize co-operation or even completely destroy it (Ostrom, 2000).”
- Promises, Threats and Fairness (2004, neutral): “For a general discussion about evolutionary foundations, see Ostrom (2000).”
- Institutional Failure in Resource Management (2006, background): “Finally, and most serious, central governments often “frustrate rather than facilitate” the local level or private efforts to provide public goods, including rules to manage resources (Ostrom 2000a, p. 138; Pinkerton & Weinstein 1995, pp. 177ff).”
- Creating culturally sustainable agri-environmental schemes (2011, background): “In addition, if monitoring and enforcement become social acts rather than regulatory acts (as is the case in effective common-pool resource management e Ostrom, 2000), culturally sustainable policy is likely to be more readily adopted by farming communities.”
- Three Decades of Climate Mitigation: Why Haven't We Bent the Global Emissions Curve? (2021, neutral): “Numerous studies have demonstrated the centrality of rules that provide some bounds to inequity and strengthen social trust for successfully navigating challenges related to the commons (141).”
- Estimating population size of a nocturnal burrow-nesting seabird using acoustic monitoring and habitat mapping (2014, background): “As multi-round public good experiments have shown, communication and interaction are critical elements in producing and sustaining trust (Ostrom 2000).”
- The Coevolution of Institutional Entrepreneurship: A Tale of Two Theories (2010, background): “The concept of institutional design for communal governance (Ostrom, 2000) is particularly relevant to the subject of institutional entrepreneurship.”
- OpenML: networked science in machine learning (2014, background): “This illustrates that what gets measured, gets rewarded, and what gets rewarded, gets done [29; 30].”
- Recycling: Social norms and warm-glow revisited (2013, background): “86 Social norms are shared perceptions of ideal forms of behaviour to which 87 individuals try to conform (Burke and Young, 2011; Ostrom, 2000).”
- Payments for ecosystem services as commodity fetishism (2010, background): “collective choices, thus they are inefficient conventions that should not be chosen from an evolutionary perspective (Ostrom, 2000).”