Collective action and the evolution of social norms

By Elinor Ostrom. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000

3,997 citations recorded by the source corpus.

I assume multiple types of players--“rational egoists,” as well as “conditional cooperators” and “willing punishers”--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/834634c92dd0d51ed7be72e4b738f4cdd5eccf62

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In Demography

  1. Ernst Fehr
  2. Simon Gächter
  3. Bruno S. Frey
  4. Urs Fischbacher
  5. Benedikt Herrmann
  6. J. Bergh
  7. L. Schechter
  8. M. Osterloh

In Safety Research

  1. Ernst Fehr
  2. Simon Gächter
  3. Urs Fischbacher
  4. Bruno S. Frey
  5. Benedikt Herrmann
  6. Armin Falk
  7. Juan-Camilo Cardenas
  8. L. Schechter

In Sociology and Political Science

  1. Ernst Fehr
  2. Bruno S. Frey
  3. Urs Fischbacher
  4. Simon Gächter
  5. Benedikt Herrmann
  6. Juan-Camilo Cardenas
  7. Armin Falk
  8. Jeffrey P. Carpenter

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