Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-based Incentives

By Venky Nagar, D. Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki. 2003

622 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/828cb6444d646aa6c7856d5cb27ab3b41ea804b8

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Citations in the corpus

The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “This is similar to the argument advanced by Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) that equity-based compensation provides managers with incentives to be more forthcoming with disclosure.”
Corporate Boards, Ownership Structures and Corporate Disclosures: Evidence from a Developing Country (2018, neutral): “on corporate performance (Ntim and Osei, 2011). One the other hand, others argue that board meeting cannot be guaranteed to be beneficial to shareholders’ interests. For example, Vafeas (1999) claims that the limited time directors spend together is used for routine tasks, such as presentation of ma”
Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months (2018, neutral): “Starting with the former, several papers examine the relation between disclosure and equity incentives (Penman (1982), Noe (1999), Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), Cheng and 3 A CEO’s equity vesting in a particular year may vest over more than one month in that year.”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, positive): “We outline goal and risk-preference alignment arguments and research below. Goal alignment. The majority of compensation research and practice is grounded in positive agency theory predictions suggesting that because it ties pay to firm outcomes, incentive pay will reduce the threat of executive opp”
Employee Ownership and Firm Disclosure (2015, background): “Importantly, conversations with union negotiators suggest that the union will use forward-looking indicators generated from guidance or conference calls to inform their negotiation stances.”
CEO Overconfidence and Management Forecasting (2016, positive): “Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) hypothesize and find that managers with more stockbased incentives issue more frequent forecasts to avoid equity mispricing, as it could adversely affect their personal wealth.”
The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting (2005, neutral): “, Noe (1999), Aboody and Kasznik (2000), and Miller and Piotroski (2000)) suggests that managers acting in the interest of existing shareholders have incentives to reduce contracting costs associated with stock compensation for new employees.”
The Effect of Litigation Risk on Management Earnings Forecasts (2011, background): “For example, Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) investigate the incentives arising out of stock-based compensation while controlling for the level of litigation risk.”
Forward-Looking MD&A Disclosures and the Information Environment (2015, neutral): “Pava and Epstein (1993) find that MD&A’s of 25 randomly selected companies mostly describe past performance.”
The Association between Board Composition and Different Types of Voluntary Disclosure (2007, positive): “Our results are also consistent with the proposition that voluntary disclosure may be driven by managerial incentive schemes (Nagar et al. , 2003), external ﬁnancing considerations (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Frankel et al. , 1995) or other factors such as the size or investment opportunities of a…”
Motives for disclosure and non-disclosure: a framework and review of the evidence (2006, background): “In related work, Rogers (2005) shows that managers tend to disclose more when they are buying firm shares on their own account and disclose less when they are selling shares.”