The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting

By John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, Shivaram Rajgopal. 2005

5,778 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6c1d3c78f737721d0f1956a680446f75049c3cac

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Citations in the corpus

Real Earnings Management and the Cost of New Corporate Bonds (2014, neutral): “Fourth, prior studies argue that REM is opaque to outside stakeholders and difficult to detect (Graham et al., 2005; Zang, 2012) because they are not subject to external monitoring and scrutiny by auditors and regulators.”
Impact of proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management (2013, neutral): “The use of REM involves changes to operating or investing activities; consequently, this type of earnings management is perceived as more difficult to detect, in part because it is assumed that auditors will not question the modified activity levels (Graham et al. 2005).”
Societal trust and corporate tax avoidance (2018, neutral): “market pressure, managers may have more pressure to report higher earnings and avoid missing earnings benchmarks (e.g., Skinner and Sloan 2002; Graham et al. 2005).”
Earnings quality research: Advances, challenges and future research (2010, background): “…The BLOCKIN BLOCKIN general BLOCKIN BLOCKIN implications BLOCKIN BLOCKIN of BLOCKIN BLOCKIN this BLOCKIN BLOCKIN research BLOCKIN BLOCKIN are BLOCKIN BLOCKIN consistent with the conclusions in Graham et al. (2005), and suggest that managers' real activities manipulation is relatively commonplace.”
Overvaluation and the Choice of Alternative Earnings Management Mechanisms (2011, neutral): “Such evidence is consistent with Graham et al. (2005), who find that managers are willing to engage in RTM to boost earnings and sustain their stock price, even though RTM is likely to destroy firm value.”
Payout Policy in the 21st Century (2003, neutral): “Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) obtain a 10.4% response rate.”
Substitution between Real and Accruals-Based Earnings Management after Voluntary Adoption of Compensation Clawback Provisions (2015, neutral): “4 Meeting certain earnings benchmarks is important, because doing so increases the firm’s credibility with the capital market, supports the firm’s stock price, and promotes the management team’s reputation (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Graham et al. 2005).”
Reputation management and the disclosure of earnings forecasts (2012, neutral): “For example, Graham et al. (2005)’s survey of financial reporting finds that more than 90% of the managers surveyed agreed with the statement that: ‘‘Voluntarily communicating financial information ... promotes a reputation for transparent/accurate reporting.’’”
Are Investors Influenced By How Earnings Press Releases Are Written? (2008, neutral): “Important benchmarks include prior year’s results, profit versus loss, and analysts’ forecast (Graham et al., 2005).”
Industry expertise on corporate boards (2017, positive): “Prior studies such as Graham et al. (2005) and Bhojraj et al. (2009) suggest that reducing R&D spending to satisfy an earnings benchmark is a major manifestation of managerial myopia in R&D investments.”
Opaque financial reports, R2, and crash risk (2009, background): “In Hong and Stein (2003), this process, combined with short sale constraints, imparts an asymmetry in which market declines differentially reveal the private signals of relatively pessimistic investors.”