The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase their Compensation?

By M. Narayanan, H. Seyhun. 2008

120 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/823c577b2f3e883f91dca33f5cee093401d6a9f4

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In Accounting

1. Yonca Ertimur
2. F. Ferri
3. David A. Maber
4. Adair Morse
5. Vikram K. Nanda
6. Amit Seru
7. Stephen Glaeser
8. X. Tian

In Finance

1. David A. Maber
2. Adair Morse
3. Vikram K. Nanda
4. F. Ferri
5. Yonca Ertimur
6. Amit Seru
7. Lu Zheng
8. Yaniv Grinstein

Citations in the corpus

• Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “However, Lie (2005) shows that the stock price increases are systematic, inconsistent with spring loading but consistent with backdating – selecting the grant dates ex post to minimize the strike price of at-the-money options and maximize their value to executives (see also Heron and Lie, 2007; Nara”
• Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating (2012, background): “7 One group of studies examining the BD phenomenon is focused on the extent of the BD practice (Narayanan and Seyhun, 2008; Bizjak et al., 2009; Heron and Lie, 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2010).”
• Do Short Sellers Front-Run Insider Sales? (2013, unknown): “4 [Insert Table 1 about here] 3 According to Thomson Financial, these cleansing codes identify observations for which: (1) collection requirements were not met; (2) numerous data elements were missing or invalid; or (3) reasonable assumptions could not be made.”
• Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors (2009, unknown): “…timing of option grants (starting with Yermack (1997)) and the more recent literature on backdating (Lie (2005), Heron and Lie (2007, 2009), and Narayanan and Seyhun (2006, 2008)) has focused on the existence of negative pregrant stock returns and/or positive postgrant stock returns as the…”
• Option Backdating and Board Interlocks (2009, unknown): “Using a broader sample of option grants between 1992 and 2002, Narayanan and Seyhun (2008) find an average CAR of −1.5% for the twenty-day period before and a 4.98% average CAR for the twenty-day period after grants.”
• Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs (2011, background): “Lie (2005), Lie and Randall (2007), Narayanan and Seyhun (2006) and Yermack (1997) find, for instance, that executive options are often backdated to hide direct cash giveaways to CEOs and senior management.”