Information Policy: Shaping the Value of Agency Relationships
By Michael G. Jacobides, David C. Croson. 2001
171 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/811d2a2fc483bfa94e28cc7a2ade2c5bb0703dc3
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Michael G. Jacobides
- Paul Louis Drnevich
- David C. Croson
- S. G. Winter
- N. J. Foss
- David J. Teece
- Giovanni Gavetti
- Richard J. Arend
Citations in the corpus
- Information Technology and Business-Level Strategy: Toward an Integrated Theoretical Perspective (2013, background): “The agencycost framework (Eisenhardt 1989; Jacobides and Croson 2001; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Levinthal 1988) emphasizes the costs of aligning (or failing to align) the incentives of the firms' employees and suppliers to act in the best interests of its owners or shareholders.”
- The Co-evolution of Capabilities and Transaction Costs: Explaining the Institutional Structure of Production (2005, background): “Alternatively, transaction costs may arise from difficulties in measuring and monitoring performance (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Barzel 1982), or the inability to specify the goods and services needed (Jacobides and Croson, 2001).”
- Industry Change Through Vertical Disintegration: How and Why Markets Emerged in Mortgage Banking (2005, background): “Also, if information on what is desired is unclear or difficult to articulate, outside procurement arrangements cannot be set up, as desired items can’t be identified ex ante (Barzel, 1982; Boisot & Child, 1988; Jacobides & Croson, 2001).”
- What Does 25 Years of Experience Tell Us About the State of Performance Measurement in Public Policy and Management? (2005, unknown): “Jacobides and Croson (2001) suggested that the use of performance information could encompass more than just a political zero-sum game between principals and agents.”
- Losing Sight of the Forest for the Trees? Productive Capabilities and Gains From Trade as Drivers of Vertical Scope (2005, unknown): “Integrated firms, in contrast, have advantages of lower measurement costs or a greater ability to utilize subjective incentives that do not rely on precise measurement (Masten et al., 1991; Jacobides and Croson, 2001).”