ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards

By Jean-Jacques Quisquater, David Samyde. Research in Smart Cards, 2001

1,253 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, Hardware and Architecture

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/80fddbf8e91dd690709950af7d5254e6b07c3084

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Citations in the corpus

Mutual Information Analysis: a Comprehensive Study (2011, background): “In the last decade, many other side-channels were exhibited, including timing [14] and electromagnetic radiation [7,23].”
Differential Privacy Under Fire (2011, background): “This rules out difficult channels such as power consumption [17] and electromagnetic radiation [13,24], essentially leaving the adversary with just two channels: the privacy budget and the query completion time.”
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution (2018, background): “Since their introduction in the late 90’s [43], many physical effects such as power consumption [41, 42], electromagnetic radiation [58], or acoustic noise [20] have been leveraged to extract cryptographic keys as well as other secrets.”
Introduction to differential power analysis (2011, methodology): “SPA and DPA techniques applied to EM measurements are termed simple electromagnetic attacks (SEMA) and differential electromagnetic attacks (DEMA) in [39–41].”
Domain-Oriented Masking: Compact Masked Hardware Implementations with Arbitrary Protection Order (2016, background): “An attacker can easily extract device internal secrets by measuring the power consumption [16] or the electromagnetic emanation [22] of the device during security critical operations.”
Semi-invasive attacks: a new approach to hardware security analysis (2005, background): “Electromagnetic analysis is best performed on a naked chip [129], and the old EPROM-hacking trick of exposing the memory protect bit of a microcontroller to UV light usually entails depackaging it.”
Fault Based Cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (2003, methodology): “Originally, [ SQ ] demonstrated the use of a passive coil to measure the electromagnetic emission of a processor according to the general theory of side-channel attacks [CKN].”
Mutual Information Analysis (2008, background): “other side-channels have been described such as electromagnetic emanation [ 15 ], timing [8], acoustics [16] etc.”
Physically Unclonable Functions (2012, background): “through their execution time [73], their power consumption [74], their electro-magnetic radiation [112], etc.”
Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting (2007, methodology): “For example, a Trojan IC whose timing is different for test inputs will get detected by timing analysis, or a Trojan IC which demonstrates a significantly different behavior compared to a genuine IC at any time during the entire computation on the test data will get detected using a Simple Power Ana”
Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys (2012, background): “The ability to continuously monitor the device makes these attacks quite powerful but typically requires physical proximity to the device, which we do not assume here.”
An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks (2007, positive): “Characteristics such as running time [18, 6], cache behavior [28], power consumption [19], and electromagnetic radiation [15, 31 ] have all been exploited to recover secret keys from implementations of dierent cryptographic algorithms.”
Optical Fault Induction Attacks (2002, background): “The electromagnetic analysis of [10] is best performed on a naked chip, and the old EPROM-hacking trick of exposing the write protect bit of a microcontroller to UV light usually entails depackaging it.”
Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography in the Bounded-Retrieval Model (2009, background): “For example, this includes side-channel attacks [20,21,28], where an adversary observes some “physical output” of a computation (radiation, power, temperature, running time etc.”
CacheBleed: a timing attack on OpenSSL constant-time RSA (2016, background): “3 University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA laboratory equipment) of physical phenomena such as electromagnetic radiation [48], power consumption [35,36], or acoustic emanation [25], and software-based attacks, which do not require additional equipment but rely instead on the attacker software r”
The EM Side-Channel(s) (2002, methodology): “Views emphasizing diﬀerent active components can be obtained by using diﬀerent types and positions of sensors [9, 12] or even by focusing on diﬀerent types of emanations that can be captured by a single sensor as we will show in this paper.”