The EM Side-Channel(s)
By Dakshi Agrawal, Bruce Archambeault, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi. Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2002
917 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, Hardware and Architecture
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b10cb04fd45f968d29ce0bdc17c4d29d12e05b67
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- François-Xavier Standaert
- Shafi Goldwasser
- Berk Sunar
- Emmanuel Prouff
- Vinod Vaikuntanathan
- Stefan Mangard
- M. Yung
- Tal Malkin
In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
- François-Xavier Standaert
- Emmanuel Prouff
- Stefan Mangard
- Pankaj Rohatgi
- Berk Sunar
- Vinod Vaikuntanathan
- Shafi Goldwasser
- Adi Akavia
In Hardware and Architecture
- François-Xavier Standaert
- Emmanuel Prouff
- Stefan Mangard
- Pankaj Rohatgi
- Tal Malkin
- Joshua Jaffe
- M. Yung
- Suresh Chari
Citations in the corpus
- Introduction to differential power analysis (2011, methodology): “SPA and DPA techniques applied to EM measurements are termed simple electromagnetic attacks (SEMA) and differential electromagnetic attacks (DEMA) in [39–41].”
- Hardware Countermeasures against DPA ? A Statistical Analysis of Their Effectiveness (2004, background): “During the last years, a lot of effort has been dedicated towards the research of side-channel attacks [1,9,10] and the development of corresponding countermeasures.”
- Principles and techniques of the quantum diamond microscope (2019, methodology): “ent through wires fabricated on the diamond. One promising application of this technique is imaging magnetic elds which oscillate near the clock frequency of circuits for side channel attack analysis [124]. NV Diamond can allow for the ability to include spatial information. Extending the sensing fr”
- Template Attacks (2002, background): “Adversaries can obtain sensitive information from side channels such as timing of operations[13], power consumption [12], electromagnetic emanations [19,9,20] etc.”
- Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired and Wireless Keyboards (2009, background): “are used, see [17, 1].”
- Simultaneous Hardcore Bits and Cryptography against Memory Attacks (2009, background): “Some well-known examples of such attacks include Kocher’s timing attacks [28], power analysis attacks [29], and electromagnetic radiation attacks [1] (see [32] for a glossary of examples.”
- A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks (extended version) (2009, methodology): “In this paper, we investigate the security of cryptographic implementations with respect to side-channel attacks, in which adversaries are enhanced with the possibility to exploit physical leakages such as power consumption [18] or electromagnetic radiation [2].”
- Physically Observable Cryptography (Extended Abstract) (2004, background): “Such restrictions may enable schemes that are more efficient or rely on weaker assumptions, while retaining security against meaningful physical observations attacks.”
- Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting (2007, background): “Several side channels [16] [17] [22] [11] [3] and side-channel analysis techniques have emerged over the past decade and have proved to be highly effective in extracting information about the internal operations of embedded devices from their timing, power consumption and electromagnetic (EM)…”
- Introduction to Side-Channel Attacks (2010, background): “The side-channel attacks we consider in this paper are a class of physical attacks in which an adversary tries to exploit physical information leakages such as timing information [10], power consumption [11] or electromagnetic radiation [1].”