An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks

By Boris Köpf, David A. Basin. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2007

387 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

A Primer on Hardware Security: Models, Methods, and Metrics (2014, methodology): “An informationtheoretic measure of side-channel leakage is quite desirable [88].”
CacheAudit: A Tool for the Static Analysis of Cache Side Channels (2013, methodology): “Technically, our work builds on methods from quantitative information-flow analysis (QIF) [14], where the automation by reduction to counting problems appears in [9, 38, 26, 37], the connection to abstract interpretation in [35], and the application to side channel analysis in [33].”
Temporal Logics for Hyperproperties (2013, background): “Quantitative information-flow policies [14, 17, 37, 39] permit leakage of information at restricted rates.”
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks (extended version) (2009, background): “We mention that in parallel to our work, the models in [3, 20] consider a restricted context of noiseless leakages.”
Introduction to Side-Channel Attacks (2010, methodology): “Selecting the inputs adaptively as suggested and analyzed in [12].”
On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow (2009, methodology): “Now, following Köpf and Basin [3], we note that f induces an equivalence relation ∼ on H:”