Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability
By Tim Besley, Andrea Prat. 2006
1,101 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8095e6865c33ff56e1154cd6bd1001158b837242
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Information Systems
- Daniel Naurin
- Catharina Lindstedt
- David Strömberg
- Ivar Kolstad
- Arne Wiig
- Konstantin Sonin
- Beatriz Magaloni
- Adriana S. Cordis
In Sociology and Political Science
- David Strömberg
- Maria Petrova
- Jesse M. Shapiro
- Matthew Gentzkow
- D. Sosyura
- Ivar Kolstad
- Daniel Naurin
- Catharina Lindstedt
Citations in the corpus
- Press Coverage and Political Accountability (2010, neutral): “So, correlations between governance and active political coverage may simply reflect that these variables are jointly determined, as discussed by Besley and Prat (2006).”
- Winners in the Spotlight: Media Coverage of Fund Holdings as a Driver of Flows (2014, background): “Our paper is also related to the literature on mutual funds.”
- The effects of media slant on firm behavior (2018, neutral): “Theoretical models examine forces that give rise to this pervasive and salient characteristic of the media (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Baron, 2006; Besley and Prat, 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010).”
- The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics (2011, background): “Several papers explore related questions in the context of media competition (e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Besley and Prat 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006).”
- Sunshine as Disinfectant: The Effect of State Freedom of Information Act Laws on Public Corruption (2014, background): “), Besley and Prat (2006), who develop a model that predicts that media capture by the government increases the likelihood that elected politicians engage in corruption and/or rent extraction and reduces the likelihood that bad politicians are identified and replaced, and Snyder and Strömberg (2010)”
- Information Manipulation, Coordination and Regime Change (2013, background): “This preference for bias affects the consumers in Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), the journalists in Baron (2006), and the media outlets in Besley and Prat (2006).”
- Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2017, positive): “Using the integral form of the mean-preserving spread condition as in Blackwell (1951), we show that the prior is a mean-preserving spread of H if and only if U is convex and lies between the upper and lower bounds generated by full and no disclosure.”
- Being The New York Times: the Political Behaviour of a Newspaper (2011, neutral): “Media outlets might also be “captured” by the incumbent government (Besley and Prat 2006).”
- Political rents in a non-corrupt democracy (2009, neutral): “33 The impact of the media market structure on monitoring e¢ ciency and potential reporting biases is discussed in Djankov et al (2003), Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Besley and Prat (2006).”
- Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (2009, methodology): “Sen (1999) and Besley and Prat (2006) emphasize the role of independent media in enhancing citizens’ ability to choose the right politicians and policies, whereas our model emphasizes the role media might play in providing incentives to bureaucrats.”