Information Manipulation, Coordination and Regime Change
By Chris Edmond. 2013
475 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a635932945e90bbf9e8b7d5321c8eac4fbf04628
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- S. Guriev
- Davide Cantoni
- Tarek A. Hassan
- David Strömberg
- Milan W. Svolik
- Ashlea Rundlett
- Noam Yuchtman
- D. Treisman
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Milan W. Svolik
- Ashlea Rundlett
- D. Treisman
- Espen Rød
- S. Guriev
- Jakub Steiner
- David Y. Yang
- Ethan BUENO DE MESQUITA
In Sociology and Political Science
- S. Guriev
- Davide Cantoni
- Milan W. Svolik
- Ashlea Rundlett
- Andrew T. Little
- Tarek A. Hassan
- D. Treisman
- Ahmed Tahoun
Citations in the corpus
- A theory of informational autocracy (2020, background): “…censor public communication and ban demonstrations (Kricheli et al. 2011); block private messages that encourage anti-regime action (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013); exaggerate their strength (Edmond 2013, Huang 2014); or use both censorship and propaganda to hinder coordination (Chen and Xu 2015).”
- Media and Politics (2015, background): “Edmond (2013) develops a model of information manipulation and political regime change.”
- The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt's Arab Spring (2017, background): “Edmond (2013) provides a theoretical analysis of how social media impacts collective action and ruler responses.”
- Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs (2010, background): “At the beginning of the game, each member of the population, i , learns his or her type (cid:1) i = (cid:1) + (cid:2) i , which I interpret as his or her level of antigovern-ment sentiment.”
- Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion (2011, unknown): “2006), nancial crises (Goldstein 2005), political action (Edmond 2008), monetary policy (Morris and Shin 2002b), and asset price volatility (Ozdenoren and Yuan 2008).”
- Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud (2016, background): “The aggregate amount of fraud will 9 See Boix and Svolik (2013), Bueno de Mesquita (2010), Edmond (2013), Little (2012), and Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011) for applications of global games and related techniques to the analysis of collective action problems in protests, repression, regime change,…”
- Who Matters in Coordination Problems (2012, background): “The following corollary of the belief constraint states the approximate relation (4) formally.”
- Empowering activists or autocrats? The Internet in authoritarian regimes (2015, methodology): “Finally, using Saudi Arabia as a case example, we illustrate how the Internet can be controlled and shaped in favor of power holders.”
- Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Antiauthoritarian Movement* (2019, background): “Edmond (2013, 1425) writes simply that “the more citizens participate in [a protest], the more likely it is that the regime is overthrown and so the more likely it is that any individual also participates.””
- Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution (2012, background): “The notion that incumbent leaders, particularly dictators, attempt to manipulate the information available to citizens is also modeled with a global games framework in Edmond (2008) and Egorov and Sonin (2011).”
- Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination (2016, unknown): “Edmond (2013) studies a different kind of policy interventions: interventions that can manipulate the information that is available to the agents, without however directly signaling information to them.”