Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data

By Georgy Egorov, S. Guriev, Konstantin Sonin. American Political Science Review, 2009

502 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6c3a3a9b4fd548c6e77033fcec431ea109d3f085

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Citations in the corpus

Social Policy and Regime Legitimacy: The Effects of Education Reform in China (2014, background): “9 See Gunther and Mughan (2000), Kern and Hainmueller (2009), Egorov et al. (2009), and Blaydes and Linzer (2012).”
Media Ownership, Concentration and Corruption in Bank Lending (2011, unknown): “In particular, Egorov et al. (2009) argue that, ―in resource rich countries, a dictator has larger rents to lose from a revolt and has less interest in providing incentives to his bureaucrats.”
Why Does China Allow Freer Social Media? Protests versus Surveillance and Propaganda (2017, unknown): “[11] Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev, and Konstantin Sonin.”
How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument (2017, background): “The idea is that coordination is essential to revolution, and coordination requires some common knowledge of shared grievances (Chwe 2013; Egorov et al. 2009; Hollyer et al. 2014; Persson and Tabellini 2006; Tilly 1978).”
Empowering activists or autocrats? The Internet in authoritarian regimes (2015, unknown): “Finally, under certain circumstances, and despite the potential perils of free media, autocrats may even permit limited freedom of the press, in order to enable an outside check on the effectiveness of their bureau-cracy (Egorov, Guriev & Sonin, 2009).”
The extractive industries and development: The resource curse at the micro, meso and macro levels (2015, background): “…democratic aspirations either in the form of excessive spending in internal security (this is what Michael Ross (2001) coins the ‘repression effect’; see also Sandbakken, 2006; Tsui, 2010; Gause, 1995) or obstruction of free information (Dutta and Roy, 2009; Egorov et al., 2009; Williams, 2011).”
Media Bias in China (2018, result): “…trade-off of media control is a key determinant of media bias is broadly consistent with leading economic theories of media bias (e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005), media capture (e.g., Besley and Prat 2006), and press freedom under authoritarian regimes (Egorov et al. 2009, Lorentzen 2014).”
Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability (2016, unknown): “…among others, have looked at resource windfalls and civil war and political violence; Deaton and Miller (1995) and Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) at incumbents’ survival; Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2009) at media repression by autocrats; and Caselli, Morelli, and Rohner (2013) at international war.”
Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs: Coordination, Public Signals, and Punishment Dilemmas (2011, background): “(2) A common theme in the literature is that public signals, which generate common knowledge, increase citizens’ incentives to revolt and raise the likelihood of collective action (e.g., Chwe 2000, 2001; Egorov et al. 2009).”
New Evidence on the Role of the Media in Corporate Social Responsibility (2016, unknown): “Empirically, Egorov et al. (2009) find a negative relationship between oil reserves and media freedom.24 Accordingly, our second instrument is LOG(OIL_RES), the logarithm of crude oil proved reserves in billion barrels obtained from International Energy Statistics.”