The effects of media slant on firm behavior

By Vishal P. Baloria, Jonas Heese. Journal of Financial Economics, 2018

128 citations recorded by the source corpus.

The media can impose reputational costs on firms because of its important role as an information intermediary and its ability to negatively slant coverage. We exploit a quasi-natural experiment that holds constant the information event across firms, but varies the availability of a major news outlet in local markets. We find that firms subject to the threat of slanted coverage suppress the release of negative information before the event and release it subsequently. Our results are consistent with theory on the active role firms can play in managing their reputational capital through anticipatory actions to avoid negative media coverage.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b752e718fa812f0cc2ec13b57ee4d3cb15d7f257

Citations in the corpus

• Media Coverage and the Cost of Debt (2019, unknown): “…(IPOs) in the equity market (see, e.g., Dyck and Zingales (2003), Fang and Peress (2009), Bushee et al. (2010), Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura (2014), Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2014), Dai, Parwada, and Zhang (2015), Al Guindy (2016), Hillert and Ungeheuer (2016), and Baloria and Heese (2018)).”