Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods

By C. Volden, Alan E. Wiseman. American Political Science Review, 2007

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Local Favoritism in At-Large Proportional Representation Systems (2016, unknown): “E-mail: jon.h.fiva@bi.no ‡University of Oslo, E-mail: a.h.halse@econ.uio.no §Institute of Transport Economics, Oslo”
Monetary Policy by Committee : Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority ? (2010, background): “However, 1 Among the theoretical contributions that examine the consequences of legislative bargaining are Baron (1991), Chari and Cole (1993), Persson et al. (2000), Battaglini and Coate (2007a, 2007b), and Volden and Wiseman (2007).”
Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect (2014, unknown): “For example, a form of transfer may be returning a portion of Security and Medicare do not satisfy the “non-rivalrous” criterion, they satisfy the “nonexcludable” criterion and are therefore often thought of as a common pool resource.”