Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter?

By Stephen Ansolabehere, J. Snyder, Michael M. Ting. American Political Science Review, 2003

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MADISON IN BAGHDAD?: Decentralization and Federalism in Comparative Politics (2006, background): “Echoing research on the United States (Lee & Oppenheimer 1999, Ansolabehere et al. 2003), Stepan (1999) and Samuels & Snyder (2001) have underscored how seriously overrepresentative most federal legislative bodies are.”
Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System (2006, background): “Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ting (2003) argue that this logic does not automatically apply to”
Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting (2005, background): “…Nathan Dietz (1996), Eyal Winter (1996), V. V. Chari et al. (1997), Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen (1998), Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan (2000), William LeBlanc et al. (2000), Nolan M. McCarty (2000a, 2000b), Hulya Eraslan (2002), Peter Norman (2002), and Ansolabehere et al. (2003).”