Dual processes in reasoning?

By P. Wason, Plymouth T Evans, Polytechnic. 1975

Subfields: Cognitive Science & Psychology

Citations in the corpus

• Learning by Distilling Context (2022, neutral): “These shortcomings are analogous to how humans are slow at performing complex cognitive tasks (Wason & Evans, 1974) and can hold only a limited amount of information in the working memory (Baddeley, 1992).”
• Belief bias in informal reasoning (2012, unknown): “The findings here bear some similarities to those of Wason and Evans ( 1975 ), the first paper to propose a dual process account of reasoning (see Lucas & Ball, 2005 , for a recent replication of main findings).”
• Dual Processes in the Psychology of Mathematics Education and Cognitive Psychology (2009, unknown): “Performance on the Wason selection task is probably the most frequently used example [Wason & Evans, 1975].”
• The complexity of developmental predictions from dual process models (2011, unknown): “Neither in the classic dual-process view of Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), nor in other older dual-process theories (Wason & Evans, 1975), nor in more contemporary dual-process views (see Evans (2008), for a review) can Type 2 processes be said to replace Type 1 processing with age.”
• Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics (2016, unknown): “…into two ‘systems’ – the fast and automatic System 1 and the slow and reflective System 2 – has been suggested by a number of psychologists (e.g. Kahneman, 2003; Wason & Evans, 1975) and is the central theme of Kahneman’s (2011) overview of his contributions to psychology and behavioural economics.”
• On the distinction between rationality and intelligence: Implications for understanding individual differences in reasoning. (2012, unknown): “…(1984, 1989) Heuristic processing Analytic processing Evans & Over (1996) Tacit thought processes Explicit thought processes Evans & Wason (1976); Wason & Evans (1975) Type 1 processes Type 2 processes Fodor (1983) Modular processes Central processes Gawronski & Bodenhausen (2006) Associative…”
• On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning (2007, unknown): “( 1983 ) demonstrated that when think-aloud protocols showed participants were focused on the conclusion of a syllogism, they showed more belief bias than when they were attending to the premises, and Evans ( 1995 ) reported that participants focus on matching cards when thinking about the hidden as”
• The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation (2006, unknown): “Participants will happily justify a choice of a matching card combination on the grounds that it will prove the rule true or prove it false, as was originally shown by Wason and Evans (1975).”
• Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective (2010, unknown): “Participants will come up with rationalizations of these choices in the context of the instructions whether or not the negation is present ( Lucas & Ball, 2005 ; Wason & Evans, 1975 ), arguing that they are verifying or falsifying the statement as applies in either case.”
• To Trust or to Think (2021, unknown): “According to the dual-process theory, humans mostly operate on System 1 thinking, which employs heuristics and shortcuts when making decisions [32, 63].”