Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size-Wage Relation

By Ján Zábojník, Dan Bernhardt. 2001

172 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/76e603e2b278b1dbebc9285cac3b8d6e9be11189

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Michael Waldman
2. Suman Ghosh
3. Jed DeVaro

Citations in the corpus

• Theory and evidence in internal labor markets (2007, background): “I believe the most important of the theoretical extensions appears in Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001).9 That paper connects the promotion-as-signal idea to the idea of labor-market tournaments discussed earlier (see also Gibbs (1995) and Ghosh and Waldman (2006)).”
• The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence (2012, background): “This suggests that the correct way to model labor-market tournaments may be by having the signal endogenously determine the size of the prize as xplored in Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) (see also Gibbs (1995)).”
• Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out contracts (2010, methodology): “This paper investigates this issue by building a model that combines asymmetric learning and tournament theory similar to the analysis in Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001).”