Evidence of Management Discrimination Among Analysts during Earnings Conference Calls

By William J. Mayew. 2008

352 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/73dd935fee6ae30bf37f7930f77c29dd65863d4a

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Citations in the corpus

Knowledge, Compensation, and Firm Value: An Empirical Analysis of Firm Communication (2014, neutral): “6 A partial list of such studies includes Tasker (1998), Frankel et al. (1999), Bowen et al. (2002), Bushee et al. (2003), Kimbrough (2005), Mayew (2008), Hollander et al. (2010), Hobson et al. (2011), and Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012).”
Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Political Risk: Measurement and Effects (2016, neutral): “In the past two decades (in particular since Regulation Fair Disclosure was enacted in October 2000), these conference calls have become a primary channel through which market participants resolve questions relating to the value of the firm’s equity (Mayew (2008)).”
The Power of Voice: Managerial Affective States and Future Firm Performance (2012, background): “and management discrimination in allowing analysts to ask questions ( Mayew, 2007 ).”
Inside the 'Black Box' of Sell-Side Financial Analysts (2014, neutral): “Consistent with (Mayew, 2008), the third most likely consequence is being “frozen out” of the Q&A portion of conference calls.”
Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Financial Statement Comparability (2013, background): “However, it is unclear ex ante whether favorable analyst recommendations are more likely driven by “inside” information than unfavorable recommendations (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien 1997; Mayew 2008).”
Analysts’ Forecasts and Asset Pricing: A Survey (2016, background): “11 optimistically bias their earnings forecasts to ensure access to management’s private information (see also Chen and Matsumoto, 2006; Mayew, 2008).4 A related stream of research links investment banking affiliation to analysts’ incentive to curry favor with management in order to have superior…”
Do Investors Benefit from Selective Access to Management? (2017, neutral): “Second, managers have less control over the questions during the presentation than during a conference call, for which there is evidence that managers discriminate based on the favorableness of the analyst (Mayew [2008]).”
Customer Satisfaction, Analyst Stock Recommendations, and Firm Value (2010, neutral): “Mayew 2008 !”
Can Investors Detect Managers' Lack of Spontaneity? Adherence to Predetermined Scripts during Earnings Conference Calls (2016, positive): “…keep private (Hollander, et al. 2010).5 Prior research suggests that managers can circumvent the extemporaneous nature of conference calls by biasing their participant selection toward more favorable analysts (Mayew 2008) or by simply refusing to answer analysts’ questions (Hollander, et al. 2010).”
Corporate Use of Social Media (2015, background): “In fact, research on conference calls often focuses on how management strategically uses the venue to put a positive spin on the firm’s performance (e.g., Mayew, 2008; Kimbrough and Louis 2011; Hobson, Mayew, and Venkatachalam 2012; Larcker and Zakolyukina 2012).”
Analysts’ Forecasts: What Do We Know after Decades of Work? (2011, neutral): “…the validity of a research conclusion, the evidence in Libby et al. (2008) regarding analysts’ desire to receive preferential or favorable treatment in conference calls (even in a post-Regulation FD environment) is also shown by Mayew (2008), who extracted data from conference call transcripts.”
Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices during Conference Calls (2010, neutral): “Indeed, prior research supports the idea that managers grant sell-side analysts, who generally have more favorable views of the firm, more access to private managerial information (e.g., Chen and Matsumoto 2006; Mayew 2008).”