Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services

By Paul J. Ferraro. 2008

621 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/726a55f39b0abeccce4cbf2df69fa9adb3373a45

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Citations in the corpus

Taking stock: A comparative analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries (2008, background): “6 ES buyers will normally require that “the seller has legal or de facto control over the habitat’s [or land area’s] fate for the duration of the contract”(Ferraro 2008).”
The Effectiveness of Payments for Environmental Services (2017, neutral): “…cost of PES implementation above the minimum payment necessary to induce landowner participation in the PES program will indirectly reduce the environmental effectiveness of the program through a reduction in the number of PES contracts that can be secured for a given budget (Ferraro, 2008).”
Incentives to Sustain Forest Ecosystem Services: A Review and Lessons for REDD (2009, methodology): “An example of how efficiency may be increased is the use of procurement auctions to reveal the ‘true’ opportunity costs involved in a PES scheme, as already used in two PES schemes in the US and Australia (Ferraro 2008).”
Designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues (2008, background): “Ferraro (this issue) examines the issue of how to structure contracts with ES providers in detail.”
Parks versus PES: Evaluating direct and incentive-based land conservation in Mexico (2017, neutral): “This potential adverse selection problem has been described many times in the literature and is formally modeled by Ferraro (2008).1 To overcome this selection problem, policymakers can target payments based on observable characteristics likely to predict the risk of deforestation (described…”
Do Payments for Environmental Services Affect Forest Cover? A Farm-Level Evaluation from Costa Rica (2012, background): “Economic theory also suggests, however, that PES may have limited effectiveness in practice (”
Payment for Ecosystem Services from Forests (2014, background): “Ferraro (2008) nicely lays out the informational challenges of PES contracts, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of auctions: On the one hand, auctions clearly reduce informational rents, but on the other hand, in low- andmiddle-income countries there can be substantial equity trade-offs…”
Evaluation of biodiversity policy instruments: what works and what doesn't? (2012, background): “Because participation in these schemes is voluntary, PES programmes are likely to suffer from moral-hazard and adverse-selection problems (Ferraro, 2008; Pattanayak et al., 2010; Ferraro et al., 2012).”
Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus (2016, background): “If this is not the case, then all efforts are, to a degree, wasted (Ferraro, 2008).”
The role of fairness and benefit distribution in community-based Payment for Environmental Services interventions: A case study from Menabe, Madagascar☆ (2010, background): “Techniques such as auctions and screening contracts can be used to induce individuals to share their true preferences and to complement publically available information on opportunity costs (Ferraro, 2008).”
Reliable, verifiable and efficient monitoring of biodiversity via metabarcoding. (2013, background): “The effectiveness of such contracts for biodiversity conservation and management might be increased by characterising the biodiversity endowments of potential land sellers and by allowing auditors, managers and consumers to condition payments, in part, on biodiversity outcomes, as well as on prescri”
Direct conservation payments in the Brazilian Amazon: Scope and equity implications (2010, background): “Finally, under (c) farmers are subjected to some procurement auction (Ferraro, 2008) that will reveal their approximate opportunity costs, but are assumed to only accept payments that exceed costs by 10%.”
Market instruments, ecosystem services, and property rights: Assumptions and conditions for sustained social and ecological benefits (2013, background): “Agencies must be capable of assessing the relative value of ompeting bids (Ferraro, 2008), of monitoring compliance with greed management actions (Engel et al., 2008; Henderson and orris, 2008), of assessing the contribution of these actions over ime to target ecosystem processes and services…”
Show Me the Money: Do Payments Supply Environmental Services in Developing Countries? (2010, background): “Two important information asymmetries in contract design can weaken the impact of PES (Ferraro 2008): hidden information and hidden action.”
The efficiency of voluntary incentive policies for preventing biodiversity loss (2009, background): “Several papers have investigated making payments to landowners a function of decisions of neighboring landowners (e.g., Smith and Shogren 2002, Parkhurst et al. 2002, Parkhurst and Shogren 2007).”