Infants Attribute Value to the Goal-Directed Actions of Self-propelled Objects
By D. Premack, A. Premack. 1997
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Citations in the corpus
- The Existential Theory of Mind (2002, background): “…with the inanimate world unless there are misleading cues typical of living kinds (e.g., self-propelled movements or animate physical features; see Premack & Premack, 1997), and, for the most part, they reserve serious mental state attribution to explaining the behaviors of intentional agents.”
- On the nature and origin of intuitive theories : learning, physics and psychology (2015, background): “Infants are also sensitive to self-propelled motion [146, 132], efficient movement towards goals given possible actions, and social responsiveness [33, 52].”
- Moral Judgment and Action in Preverbal Infants and Toddlers (2013, background): “…grasp that agents work together toward shared goals (Henderson & Woodward, 2011), categorize goal-helping as positive and goal-hindering as negative (Premack & Premack, 1997), and understand how being helped and hindered influences one’s social preferences (e.g., Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003).”
- Psychological Reasoning in Infancy. (2016, background): “…infer a variety of goals including: inspecting, reaching, obtaining, or displacing an object; comforting, helping, hindering, chasing, or hitting an agent; 2011; Johnson et al. 2007a, 2010; Király et al. 2003; Kuhlmeier et al. 2003; Luo & Baillargeon 2005a; Premack & Premack, 1997; Woodward 1998).”
- The mentalistic basis of core social cognition: experiments in preverbal infants and a computational model. (2013, unknown): “Infants in the first year of life distinguish positive and negative social acts (Premack & Premack, 1997); react differentially to those who direct helpful versus harmful intentions toward them, despite superficially similar behaviors and identical outcomes (e.g., Behne, Carpenter, Call, &…”
- Unraveling the enigma of human intelligence: Evolutionary psychology and the multimodular mind. (2002, background): “…capable of self-generated motion (making the inanimate/animate distinction) (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995; Mandler & McDonough, in press; Premack & Premack, 1997) and they assume that the selfpropelled movement of animate objects is caused by invisible internal states -- goals and…”