Media Bias and Reputation

By Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse M. Shapiro. Journal of Political Economy, 2006

1,235 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6ce27e8ceb8e7aa4e40d99312b6c98ac3f5260fb

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Matthew Gentzkow
2. Maria Petrova
3. David Strömberg
4. Ro’ee Levy
5. Ralf Dewenter
6. Ulrich Heimeshoff
7. A. Shleifer
8. Joshua Schwartzstein

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Ro’ee Levy
2. David Strömberg
3. Matthew Gentzkow
4. Maria Petrova
5. Jesse M. Shapiro
6. David G. Rand
7. Gordon Pennycook
8. A. Shleifer

In Strategy and Management

1. Ro’ee Levy
2. David Strömberg
3. Maria Petrova
4. Ulrich Heimeshoff
5. Ralf Dewenter
6. Jesse M. Shapiro
7. Michael Sinkinson
8. Wing Suen

Citations in the corpus

• Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability (2006, neutral): “Gentzkow and Shapiro [14] use data from nine predominantly Muslim countries to study the e¤ect of media exposure on citizens’attitudes towards the United States.”
• Information Manipulation, Coordination and Regime Change (2013, neutral): “A recent literature determines the equilibrium degree of media bias emerging from competition between media outlets (e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Baron, 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006).”
• Ideological Segregation Online and Offline (2011, neutral): “Both Bayesian (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Acemoglu 24 et al. 2009) and non-Bayesian (Lord et al. 1979) mechanisms may lead people with divergent political views to interpret the same information differently, and the beliefs of conservatives and liberals frequently diverge on important factual…”
• Being The New York Times: the Political Behaviour of a Newspaper (2011, neutral): “Customers on the media market are willing to pay for ideologically consonant content either because they dislike feelings of cognitive dissonance (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005), or because they think that ideologically closer sources are more credible (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006).”
• ENERGY CONSERVATION “NUDGES” AND ENVIRONMENTALIST IDEOLOGY: EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY FIELD EXPERIMENT (2010, neutral): “…household’s electricity usage in 2006, Age is the age of the head of the household, Liberal is a dummy equal to one if the household head was registered as either a Democrat, Green, or Peace and Freedom party member, and Unregistered is a dummy equal to one of if the household was not registered.”
• The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics (2011, background): “Several papers explore related questions in the context of media competition (e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Besley and Prat 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006).”
• Partisan conflict and private investment (2015, neutral): “Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) showed that news content is mostly demand driven; that is, the ideological slant of newspapers is driven by the ideology of the audience they are trying to capture, rather than that of the owners or the editors.”
• Persuasion: Empirical Evidence (2010, neutral): “newspaper markets, Gentzkow and Shapiro (forthcoming) use automated searches to measure the political slant of 420 US newspapers. They use these measures to estimate the demand for slant (the readers’ preferences) and the supply of slant (the newspaper’s preferences). They document a statistically a”
• A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice (2011, background): “Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) also focus on the supply side, demonstrating that a media outlet’s concern for reputation can lead to the censoring of unexpected stories.”
• Inequality and Media Capture (2008, positive): “6Empirical results of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006b) suggest that at least in the US there is no significant conflict of interest between media owners and media consumers.”
• Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets (2013, neutral): “…active electorate increases the incentives for a government to be responsive (Besley and Burgess 2001; Strömberg 24 Mass media can also affect policy making by creating a bias in the provision of information (Baron 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Sutter 2001).”