Moral psychology is relationship regulation: moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality.
By Tage S. Rai, Alan Page Fiske. Psychology Review, 2011
811 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6ca7f3a6f2d2bd6fc898e71d6b68b1d34b63a755
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Francesca Gino
- Celia Moore
- N. Ellemers
- Adam Waytz
- Max H. Bazerman
- Liane L. Young
- Kurt Gray
- Maurice E. Schweitzer
In Social Psychology
In Sociology and Political Science
- N. Ellemers
- Stefano Pagliaro
- Francesca Gino
- Manuela Barreto
- C. Leach
- Max H. Bazerman
- Celia Moore
- T. Cohen
Citations in the corpus
- The Role of Moral Emotions in Military Trauma: Implications for the Study and Treatment of Moral Injury (2014, background): “Some social-functional models emphasize that the context of a particular social relationship will determine whether a given action will be perceived as moral or immoral (Rai & Fiske, 2011), and thereby evoke positive or negative moral emotions, respectively.”
- GROUPS AND MORALITY (2014, background): “All social interactions require some common ground upon which the involved parties can coordinate their behavior (Brown, 1965; Caporael, 1997; Harré, 1993; Moscovici, 1993; Rai & Fiske, 2011).”
- The Sudden Devotion Emotion: Kama Muta and the Cultural Practices Whose Function Is to Evoke It (2019, background): “…certainly a moral facet involved in some experiences of kama muta, but we posit that it is limited to the morality of CS: loving-kindness, compassion, and sacrifice for the group or partner (on CS morality vs. the moralities of the other three fundamental relational models, see Rai & Fiske, 2011).”
- Predicting Counterproductive Work Behavior from Guilt Proneness (2012, background): “However, in most circumstances harming others is considered a moral violation (Graham et al. 2011; Haidt 2007; Rai and Fiske 2011).”
- Are liars ethical? On the tension between benevolence and honesty (2014, background): “That is, the reason we value justice may have more to do with its role in protecting individuals, than our preference for formal rules (Rai & Fiske, 2011; Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991).”
- Moral character: What it is and what it does (2014, background): “…self-interest, but rather about balancing self-interest with the interests of other people (Frimer, Schaefer, & Oakes, 2014; Frimer, Walker, Dunlop, Lee, & Riches, 2011).1 Simply put, morality is embedded in our social relationships and our need to regulate them effectively (Rai & Fiske, 2011).”
- Blind loyalty? When group loyalty makes us see evil or engage in it (2016, background): “…one of ‘‘the Big Three [codes] of Morality” that Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (1997) contend drive human action (the others being autonomy and divinity) and within Fiske et al.’s relational models approach to moral action (Fiske, 1991, 1992, 2004; Fiske & Haslam, 2005; Rai & Fiske, 2011).”
- Ethically adrift: How others pull our moral compass from true North, and how we can fix it (2013, background): “In many ways, morality emerged as a means of regulating our social relationships (Rai & Fiske, 2011).”
- Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality (2012, background): “The idea that the essence of morality is the perceived interaction between minds echoes other research that emphasizes the social function of morality (Haidt, 2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011).”
- Morality in Groups: On the Social‐Regulatory Functions of Right and Wrong (2012, background): “…judgments (e.g., Haidt & Kesebir, 2010), have distinguished between different moral foundations or principles that can guide such judgments (Haidt, 2001, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Turiel, 2006), and have specified the social concerns associated with each of these principles (Rai & Fiske, 2011).”