Rawls' Linguistic Analogy: A Study of the 'Generative Grammar' Model of Moral Theory Described by John Rawls in 'A Theory of Justice.' (Phd Dissertation, Cornell University, 2000)

By John Mikhail. 2000

100 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Information Systems and Management, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6c4a22e95f677fc269614656067b290e928bfdc0

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Citations in the corpus

Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie (2009, background): “…referred to as the trolley dilemma), people typically judge that it is morally acceptable to divert a runaway trolley that threatens five lives onto a side track, where it will run over and kill only one person instead (Greene et al., 2001; Mikhail, 2000; Petrinovich, O'Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993).”
Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers (2012, background): “…worse to throw somebody in front of a train as a means of stopping it from hitting five others (the ‘push’ case) than to divert a train away from five people with the side-effect that it hits one person instead (the ‘switch’ case) (Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2000; Petrinovich and O’Neill, 1996).”
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. (2008, background): “, 2006; Haidt & Baron, 1996; Schaich Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006) and the distinction between harms that are intended and those that are merely foreseen (Aquinas, unknown/2006; Cushman et al., 2006; Mikhail, 2000; Schaich Borg et al., 2006).”
The Moral Psychology Handbook (2010, background): “The argument from the universality and early development of the so-called moral/conventional distinction to the evolution of morality is best viewed as a poverty of the stimulus argument (Dwyer, 1999, 2006; Mikhail, 2000).”
Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. (2008, background): “This question has framed decades of research in moral psychology and remains at its heart (Alicke, 2000; Baron & Ritov, 2004; Cushman et al., 2006; Darley & Shultz, 1990; Hauser, 2006; Heider, 1958; Mikhail, 2000; Piaget, 1965/1932; Pizarro et al., 2003; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995).”
The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (2005, background): “Such mysterious nuggets of apparent moral wisdom encourage the thought that somewhere, deep in our cognitive architecture, we’re going to find the mother lode: an innate ‘‘moral grammar’’ (Harman, 2000; Mikhail, 2000; Rawls, 1971; Stich, 1993).”
The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues (2008, background): “Dwyer (1999), Mikhail (2000) , and Hauser et al. (forthcoming) have also used this distinction to draw a distinction between our knowledge of moral principles and our moral judgments and decisions at a given time.”
What is moral reasoning? (2015, background): “…addition of other psychological processes, such as the emotions or a Moral Faculty (Dwyer, 2006, 2009; Hauser, 2006; Hauser, Young, & Cushman, 2008; Mikhail, 2000, 2007, 2009),18 then there is something genuinely different and special about the causal mechanisms of moral reasoning that is not…”
Pushing moral buttons: the interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. (2009, methodology): “The loop weight dilemma (Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2000) is identical to the loop dilemma except that a heavy weight positioned behind the victim on the side-track, rather than the victim, stops the trolley (n = 74, Figure 3b).”
Order effects in moral judgment (2012, unknown): “…Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Mikhail, 2000, 2007; Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007).”
A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications (2007, background): “The critical prediction of the intuitionist perspective is a dissociation between judgment and justifi cation for certain moral dilemmas ( Haidt, 2001; Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2000; Mikhail, in press; Hauser et al. , in press; Rawls, 1971 ).”
The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment (2006, result): “First, our results underscore the methodological importance of linking subjects’ expressed moral principles to the operative principles underlying their patterns of judgment (Hauser, in press; Mikhail, 2000).”