Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers
By Eric Schwitzgebel, Fiery Cushman. 2012
347 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Information Systems and Management, Social Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ef782fa2ff1f818a8530bc17920ddf9273e7127c
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Citations in the corpus
- Debiasing Decisions (2015, background): “Philosophers trained in logic exhibit the same preference reversals in similar moral dilemmas as academics without logic training (Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012), and physicians exhibit the same preference reversals as untrained patients for equivalent medical treatments when those treatments are…”
- Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts? (2013, background): “Previous research has uncovered that philosophers’ intuitions are in some cases subject to order effects (Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012), and that the possession of a personality trait, namely extraversion, can predict some intuitions of philosophers (Schulz, Cokely, & Feltz, 2011).”