Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie

By Joshua D. Greene. 2009

237 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Abstract A substantial body of research supports a dual-process theory of moral judgment, according to which characteristically deontological judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes. This theory was initially supported by neuroimaging and reaction time (RT) data. McGuire et al. have reanalyzed these initial RT data and claim that, in light of their findings, the dual-process theory of moral judgment and the personal/impersonal distinction now lack support. While McGuire and colleagues have convincingly overturned Greene et al.’s interpretation of their original RT data, their claim that the dual-process theory now lacks support overstates the implications of their findings. McGuire and colleagues ignore the results of several more recent behavioral studies, including the study that bears most directly on their critique. They dismiss without adequate justification the results of a more recent neuroimaging study, three more recent patient studies, and an emotion–induction study. Their broader critique is based largely on their conflation of the dual-process theory with the personal/impersonal distinction, which are independent.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/79b6883bdddad715be7c7b8fe76500605fdd8d76

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Citations in the corpus

Moral disengagement of hotel guest negative WOM: moral identity centrality, moral awareness, and anger. (2014, background): “The process of moral disengagement requires processing relevant information; information that could be both cognitive and emotional (Greene, 2009).”
How Quick Decisions Illuminate Moral Character (2013, background): “Most research on the psychology of moral judgment has focused on the moral evaluation of acts—for example, why some acts are deemed permissible or impermissible (Gilligan, 1982; Greene, 2009; Kohlberg, 1969).”
Moral Symbols: A Necklace of Garlic against Unethical Requests (2017, background): “Adopting a middle ground, some researchers have endorsed a dual-system perspective and have argued that both deliberate reasoning and automaticity play a role in moral judgment and behavior (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene, 2009; Haidt, 2001; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007).”