Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment.

By Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, K. Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom, J. Cohen. Cognition, 2008

1,113 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/53fee14aedd00bd9d8813684d392673fcd373aa9

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Citations in the corpus

Trait psychopathy and utilitarian moral judgement: The mediating role of action aversion (2015, background): “This is exactly what is observed (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013; Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Mikhail, 2007).”
The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values (2014, background): “In contrast, Greene and colleagues have proposed an alternative model that affords analytic reasoning processes a larger role in determining moral judgement (Greene, 2007, 2012; Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008; Paxton & Greene, 2010).”
Approach, Ability, Aftermath: A Psychological Process Framework of Unethical Behavior at Work (2015, background): “…(that is, where an agent’s direct action may result in serious bodily harm to a specific individual or group) (Greene et al., 2001), as well as decisions where one arrives at a deontological or principle-based conclusion rather than a consequentialist one (Greene et al., 2008; Greene et al., 2004).”
The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Judgment (2010, background): “We found, first, that introducing the promise factor reproduces the familiar pattern of mPFC/PCC/TPJ activity and, second, that utilitarian judgment in the promise dilemmas is associated with increased activity in the DLPFC (right BA 46) (Greene et al., 2008b).”
The Costs and Benefits of Calculation and Moral Rules (2010, neutral): “Goods like human life and natural resources are often bestowed this sort of sacred or protected status, and people react strongly to proposed tradeoffs of these resources on moral grounds.”
Why does the Cognitive Reflection Test (sometimes) predict utilitarian moral judgment (and other things) (2015, background): “Second, cognitive interference increases RT of utilitarian esponses but not RT of deontological (non-utilitarian, rule-based) esponses (Greene et al., 2008).”
Moral Emotions and Social Activism: The Case of Animal Rights (2009, background): “intuitionist model exemplifies this “new synthesis” approach to the moral judgment process (Haidt, 2008; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007). Social intuitionists argue that moral decisions involve two distinct components.1 The first and most important is intuition—a process which is unconscious, instantaneous”
Virtual Reality for Enhanced Ecological Validity and Experimental Control in the Clinical, Affective and Social Neurosciences (2015, background): “…perspective both controlled cognitive responses and automatic affective responses perform essential roles in moral decision making (see also Greene et al., 2008): (1) Automatic and Hot affective processes drive non-utilitarian processes and reflect prohibition of harm, in which negative…”
Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward) (2011, positive): “Going back to the trolley scenario, it has since been shown that pulling a trap door from underneath the large man may be okay, but pushing him with a pole over the edge is not (Greene et al 2008a).”
Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism (2012, background): “Adapted from Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009). 76 Jesse Graham et al.”