The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering*

By Malcolm Baker, Paul A. Gompers. Journal law and economy, 2003

600 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6aed6d8cc4dce3b0c25a67032f1111881877e1c0

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Citations in the corpus

Female leadership, performance, and governance in microfinance institutions. (2014, background): “Furthermore, a robust result in the general board literature is that the more complex the firm is in terms of the size and span of its operations, the more outside directors are recruited (Baker and Gompers, 2003; Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008).”
Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance (2009, background): “We include CEOOWN and CEOTEN because Bathala and Rao (1995), Baker and Gompers (2003), and Kieschnick and Moussawi (2004) provide evidence that board independence decreases with CEO influence.”
Do Venture Capitalists Influence the Decision to Manage Earnings in Initial Public Offerings (2006, neutral): “Baker and Gompers (2003) show that boards of firms backed by VCs have fewer insiders as directors and suggest that VCs create boards with greater independence and oversight.”
Initial Public Offerings: A synthesis of the Literature and Directions for Future Research (2018, background): “Prior to the IPO, a VC typically advises a company on its business and financial strategy, helps it to establish a governance structure (Baker and Gompers (2003) and Hochberg (2012)), and assists it in raising additional funds. The VC is generally closely involved with the company until the company ”
The Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts (2008, background): “They ﬁnd no relation between the initialvaluation pro-visions (as in Daines and Klausner [2001], Field and Karpoff [2002], and Smart and Zutter [2003]), or the board (as in Baker and Gompers [2003]).”
Preplanned Exit Strategies in Venture Capital (2008, neutral): “Further empirical research along these lines could also consider investor valuations practices and due diligence reviews, as well as the interplay between contractual governance, innovation and performance (in the spirit of Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Baker and Gompers, 2003).”
The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “For example, Baker and Gompers (2003) find evidence consistent with successful CEOs being able to bargain for less independent boards.”
Endogenously Structured Boards of Directors in Banks (2010, background): “That is, board independence decreases with CEO’s (negotiation) power and increases with constraints on such CEO power (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Baker and Gompers 2003; Boone et al. 2007; Linck et al. 2008).”
Boards: Does One Size Fit All? (2008, background): “For instance, Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hermalin Weisbach (1991), and, more recently, Bhagat and Black (2001), find no relation between the percentage of outside directors on the board and Tobin’s Q.”
A Signaling Theory of Acquisition Premiums: Evidence from IPO Targets (2012, methodology): “A first-stage VC choice model was estimated that follows Baker and Gompers (2003) in employing state location dummies for instrumentation purposes, and in none of the three estimated second-stage models (a model for the full sample, and two models for the subsamples of firms backed by prominent VCs…”
Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey (2011, positive): “9 Both Baker and Gompers (2003) and Hochberg (2003) find that VC backing is associated with more independent boards. Lerner (1995) reports that board representations increase around CEO turnover and is higher the more distant the companies and VCs are from each other. Cornelli et al. (2010), using E”