Evolution of the social contract

By Daniel Taylor. 2014

339 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/664741c8e6ad9c1be441ec275f93673904e1b5f0

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Citations in the corpus

Society-in-the-loop: programming the algorithmic social contract (2017, background): “This is, traditionally, a problem of deﬁning a social contract [70].”
Rational choice theory (2013, background): “One more important difference between conventional and evolutionary game theory is that the former focuses on the choices of players (who chose what), while the latter studies the distribution of strategies (how many players chose what) (Skyrms, 1996).”
Games on graphs (2014, background): “Evolutionary game theory [54], [53], [17], [89], [118], [37], [38], [66], [12] is the study of evolution when selection depends on the relative abundance (D frequency) of strategies or phenotypes in the population.”
Optimal control as a graphical model inference problem (2009, unknown): “The stag hunt allows for the study of cooperation within social structures (Skyrms 1996) and for studying the collaborative behavior of multi-agent systems (Yoshida et al.”
Navigating Into the Future or Driven by the Past (2013, background): “I could go onto the Internet and play bridge.”
Why humans are (sometimes) less rational than other animals: Cognitive complexity and the axioms of rational choice (2013, background): “…can, in theory, deviate from the axioms of rational choice because it is possible for the optimisation of fitness at the genetic level to dissociate from optimisation at the level of the organism (Barkow, 1989; Cooper, 1989; Dawkins, 1982; Houston, 1997; Over, 2002; Skyrms, 1996; Stanovich, 2004).”