Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

By David J. Cooper, K. Kühn. 2009

168 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Demography, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ac08ebf7e9093c18de0c1becf839402c2b8f7861

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Citations in the corpus

fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust (2009, unknown): “9A recent paper by Cooper and Kuhn (2010) shows that allowing for free-form communication may foster more stable and effective collusive agreements, for two main reasons.”
Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence (2015, background): “Hence the papers cannot explain to what extent a leniency policy in uences the decision of a cartel to operate with or without ringleaders.(15) The role of ringleaders is thoroughly analyzed in the empirical work by Davies and De (2013).”
On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey (2018, methodology): “Another design, used by Andersson and Wengström (2012), Cooper and Kühn (2014a), and Cooper and Kühn (2014b), consists of a fixed number of rounds of the PD with discounting, followed by a coordination game.”
Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion (2020, unknown): “Beyond this basic structure, reinforcement learning comes in many different varieties.(11) Ideally, one would like to experiment with those algorithms that are more prevalent in practice but, as mentioned above, little is known on the specific software firms actually use.”
Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random termination (2016, unknown): “Two of these methods involve a fixed number of repetitions with payoff discounting, followed by random termination (proposed by Cabral, Ozbay, and Schotter [2011]) or followed by a coordination game (proposed by Cooper and Kühn [2011]).”
Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion – The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments (2012, unknown): “Interestingly, we do not observe a single instance of deviation when firms take turns (see below our general discussion of deviations), so this strategy is rather successful.(17) We find that these five markets explain roughly half of the p = 99 observations (64 of 120).”