Estimating the Value of Political Connections

By Raymond J. Fisman. 2001

2,916 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6757e8b97caa89096071c69e22157d10940a3fa5

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Citations in the corpus

THE CONTINGENT VALUE OF LOCAL PARTNERS' BUSINESS GROUP AFFILIATIONS (2008, background): “help improve organizational performance (Fisman, 2001; Hillman & Keim, 1995).”
Economic growth with endogenous corruption: an empirical study (2011, background): “6See Fisman (2001) for a discussion of the value of Suharto’s power to those who obtained access to the dictator. 7Neeman et al. (2008) presents an excellent discussion of the merit of choosing the level of GDP rather than growth rate as the dependent variable.”
US political corruption and firm financial policies (2016, background): “4 The effects of cross-country differences in attitudes toward corruption can be nontrivial: Fisman and Miguel (2007) find that United Nations diplomats accumulated parking violations while in New York City at rates that reflected corruption at home.”
The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms (2011, positive): “Close relationships consist of cases of well-known friendship, as identified from The Economist , Forbes , or Fortune ; share ownership or directorships held by former heads of state or prime ministers as well as former directorships held by current politicians, foreign politicians, and well documen”
Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election (2006, neutral): “ri = β1Bush-favoredi + β2Gore-favoredi + ui (8)”
The Role of Family in Family Firms (2006, positive): “Politics Finally, political connections can provide large benefits for private firms, especially in economies with high levels of corruption (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, forthcoming 2006).”
Diamonds are Forever, Wars are Not - Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms? (2005, positive): “The first is a growing body of political event studies − e.g. Roberts (1990), Fisman (2001), and Johnson and Mitton (2003) − which examine events that affected specific political figures to estimate their impact on companies that had different degrees of political connections with those figures.”
Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud (2014, background): “Ties with the government help firms to gain comparative advantages that enhance firm performance and value (Fan et al. 2008; Fisman 2001; Goldman et al. 2009; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Millar et. al 2005; Wu et al. 2012a, b).”
Extended Family and Kinship Networks: Economic Insights and Evolutionary Directions (2008, background): “Fisman (2001b), for instance, interprets evidence that supplier credit is preferentially given to members of the same ethnic group as evidence of family ties.”
Does Giving Lead to Getting? Evidence from Chinese Private Enterprises (2010, neutral): “There is also an emerging literature regarding the impact of political connections on enterprise performance (Faceio, 2006; Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005).”