The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms

By Paul K. Chaney, Mara Faccio, David Parsley. 2011

1,158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b3d4a7252d506a8e61a3c96485d2d06948218eaa

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Citations in the corpus

Corruption and destructive entrepreneurship (2017, positive): “Politically connected firms can also benefit from having easier access to credit, government bailouts in time of crises, and lower cost of debt (Chaney et al. 2011; Faccio et al. 2006; Narjess et al. 2013).”
Accrual-based and real earnings management and political connections (2015, methodology): “3 Consistent with Chaney et al. (2011), we excluded firms that are located in countries that have not a single political connection, because these data may bias the results.”
Auditor choice in privatized firms: Empirical evidence on the role of state and foreign owners (2009, background): “In comparison to other firms, Chaney et al. (2007) find that politically-connected firms report lower quality earnings.”
High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world (2010, methodology): “Consistent with Chaney et al. (2007), accounting information quality (s(CFO) and Acc_Quality) is significantly better for non-connected firms than for connected firms.”
Political Uncertainty and Accounting Conservatism (2013, positive): “For example, using a sample of international firms, Chaney et al. (2011) find that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) document”
The Real Effects of Political Uncertainty: Elections and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Prices (2010, background): “This is confirmed empirically by Chaney et al. (2008) who find that the quality of earnings reported by politically affiliated firms is significantly worse than by non-affiliated firms. Finally, scarce outside financing becomes unevenly distributed among companies if managers are politically-connect”
Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, methodology): “Chaney et al. (2008) add to this evidence by showing that although 4 Further evidence is provided in Roberts (1990) and Goldman et al. (2006) who show that on average, the connections created by campaign contributions add value to U.S. firms.”
China's 'Mercantilist' Government Subsidies, the Cost of Debt and Firm Performance (2018, positive): “…suggests that political connections facilitate connected firms to gain preferential treatment, to lessen financial constraints, and to reduce the transaction cost involved in searching for and complying with regulatory or licensing procedures (Srinidh et al., 2011; Chaney et al., 2011).”