Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model

By Béatriz Armendariz de Aghion, Christian Gollier. 2000

240 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/66d06f679d353005c62026517499d0d2bf30d9f9

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In Management Science and Operations Research

In Safety Research

Citations in the corpus

Contract Structure, Risk Sharing and Investment Choice (2011, background): “This paper adds to an emerging experimental literature (Charness and Genicot 2007, Barr and Genicot 2007, Robinson 2007) that uses the precise control 5The theory of strategic default on micronance contracts is explored in Besley and Coate (1995) and Armendáriz de Aghion (1999), while Armendáriz de”
Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups (2009, unknown): “…and Laffont (2000), and Sadoulet (2000)) or by the insurance effect that results from diversification even if borrowers do not know each other well (Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier (2000)), (ii) ex-ante moral hazard: ensuring that the funds will be used properly (Stiglitz (1990) and Laffont and…”
Using Repayment Data to Test Across Models of Joint Liability Lending (2007, background): “1 Ghatak (2000), Gangopadhyay et al. (2005), and Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier (2000) also examine joint liability lending in the context of adverse selection.”
Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect (2000, background): “Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier (1998) is another paper that looks at a similar environment and shows that joint liability can improve the pool of borrowers if borrowers have perfect knowledge of their partners.”
On mission drift in microfinance institutions (2011, unknown): “December 24, 2010 12:29 9.75in x 6.5in b980-ch15 Handbook of Microfinance FA 352 Beatriz Armendáriz and Ariane Szafarz (1999), Conning (1999), Ghatak (1999), Ghatak (2000), Armendáriz and Gollier (2000), Jain and Mansuri (2003), and Tedeschi (2006), Labie et al. (2010), and many others.”
Microcredit Under the Microscope: What Have We Learned in the Past Two Decades, and What Do We Need to Know? (2013, background): “They follow Armendáriz de Aghion & Gollier (2000) (who study the same problem under the assumption of no collusion) in assuming that the safe types also get higher payoffs when they succeed.5 Therefore, raising the interest rate or the liability payment pushes out only the worse types.”
Group Versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines (2006, unknown): “…2000) and Sadoulet (2000) explore group loans in the context of adverse selection when borrowers are fully informed about other borrowers, while Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier (2000) and N’Guessan and Laffont (2000) argue in favor of group loans even when borrowers do not know each other well.”
Social Connections and Group Banking (2007, unknown): “Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier (2000) and Armendariz de Aghion (1999) show theoretically how peer monitoring alone, with random formation of groups, can help overcome adverse selection problems when monitoring is costly for the lending institution itself.”
Systematic Review. What is the evidence of the impact of microfinance on the well-being of poor people? (2011, background): “(2005) and Armendáriz de Aghion and Gollier (2000) were inspired by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and focused on adverse selection and screening mechanisms.”
The effect of social capital on group loan repayment: evidence from field experiments* (2007, unknown): “The best example of this view is Armendáriz de Aghion and Gollier (2000).”