Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups
By X. Giné, Dean S. Karlan. 2009
155 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0a3b3404225a08f041c237e1009a30bebd56dae8
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Erica M. Field
- Rohini Pande
- Yoonyoung Cho
- G. Fischer
- Ralph De Haas
- Maddalena Honorati
- Ben Feigenberg
- B. K. Jack
In Economics and Econometrics
- Rohini Pande
- Erica M. Field
- Yoonyoung Cho
- G. Fischer
- Ralph De Haas
- Maddalena Honorati
- Heike Harmgart
- Ben Feigenberg
In Safety Research
- Yoonyoung Cho
- G. Fischer
- Maddalena Honorati
- Ben Feigenberg
- B. K. Jack
- O. Attanasio
- Erica M. Field
- Rohini Pande
Citations in the corpus
- Systematic Review. What is the evidence of the impact of microfinance on the well-being of poor people? (2011, unknown): “Goldberg (2005) refers to the 1998 working paper version, but does not highlight the methodological innovation in the study (pipeline and IV in panel analysis).”
- Building Social Capital Through Microfinance (2010, unknown): “These improvements in risk-sharing are made even more striking by the fact that they obtained in the absence of group liability contracts, and provide a rationale for the current trend among MFIs of maintaining repayment in group meetings despite the transition from group to individual liability con”
- Group lending or individual lending? Evidence from a randomised field experiment in Mongolia (2011, background): “Zia (2010) exploit a quasi-experiment in which an Indian MFI switched from individual to joint-liability contracts, the reverse of the switch in Giné and Karlan (2010). They find that”
- The Economic Returns to Social Interaction: Experimental Evidence from Microfinance (2013, background): “…we observe are even more striking because they were obtained in the absence of joint-liability contracts, and provide a rationale for the current trend among MFIs of maintaining repayment in group meetings despite the transition from joint- to individualliability contracts (Gine and Karlan, 2011).”
- Contract Structure, Risk Sharing and Investment Choice (2011, background): “Giné and Karlan (2011) overcome this limitation with a large, natural field experiment that randomly assigned individuals into joint and individual liability loan contracts.”
- Entrepreneurship Programs in Developing Countries: A Meta Regression Analysis (2013, background): “However, evaluations on the effects of expanding access to credits in Mongolia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, India, South Africa, Morocco, and the Philippines (Attansio et al. 2012; Augsburg et al. 2012; Banerjee et al. 2009; Karlan and Zinman, 2010; Crepon et al, 2011; Gine and Karlan, 2009) suggested t”
- Access to Finance (2010, unknown): “In two experiment with a microlender in the Philippines, Giné and Karlan (2009) first randomly assign groups of joint liability clients to either remain under joint liability or to have their loans converted to individual liability, and second randomized before the initial creation of lending…”
- Market inefficiencies and the adoption of agricultural technologies in developing countries 1 (2013, background): “However, there is little evidence that joint liability performs better than individual liability (Giné and Karlan 2011).”